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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TROY 0. NANCE, and 
THOMAS B. HANLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
SHEET METAL WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION, an 
unincorporated association, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9111 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
PROCEEDINGS IN TRIAL COURT 
This is an action 'to set aside the expulsion of 
two members from membership in the defendant 
union. The proceeding was originally instituted by 
plaintiff Nance by filing a petition for a writ of 
mandamus to compel defendant to vacate and set 
aside his expulsion. Plain tiff Hanley was perm'i'tted 
to intervene in the action seeking the same relief 
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with respect to his own expulsion. In order to avoid 
confusion we shall hereafter refer to Nance and 
Han1ley either by name or as plaintiffs, and shall 
refer to appellant Sheet Metal Workers Interna-
tional Association either as the union or as defen-
dant. 
The action was 'tried in two phases, the first 
before the court sitting without a jury and the 
second before a jury. The first related to the legality 
of the expulsion and the right to recover exemplary 
damages and attorneys fees. The second, that tried 
before a jury, related to the right of plaintiffs to 
re-cover compensatory damages and punitive dam-
ages after expulsion. 
At the conclusion of the taking of evidence on 
the isues tried before the court without a jury, the 
court on December 30, 1958, rendered a Memor-
andum of Decision finding that plaintiffs had been 
wrongfully expelled. This Memorandum of Decision 
is printed on Pages 1 to 10 of the appendix to 
this brief. The court fo'Ilowed this decision by a 
Supplemental Memorandum of Decision on January 
9, 1959, which is printed on Pages 11 to 12 of the 
appendix to this brief. Although finding that plain-
tiffs had been wrongfully expelled, the court post-
poned decision on the issues whether the defendant 
had acted wilfully and maliciously and whether as 
a consequence thereof plaintiffs were entitled tore-
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cover punitive and exemplary damages and attor-
neys fees pending trial of the issues to be tried be-
fore the jury. 
On January 13, 1959, a pre-trial conference 
was held regarding procedure in connection with 
presentation of issues to the jury. The court re-
ferred to the demand for jury filed by plaintiffs 
and the stipulation between the parties at the pre-
trials prior to the commencement of the trial to 
the effect that the court should determine the le-
gality of the expulsions without a jury, and raised 
the question as to whether the stipulation was in-
tended to cover trial of the issue as to exemplary 
damages for wrongful expulsion by the court with-
out a jury as it did not appear to be clearly covered 
by the prior stipulations of the parties (Pre-T. 
1-13-59, p. 2). Counsel for defendant then raised 
the question as to whether the jury would be a com-
mon law jury or only an advisory jury (ibid, p. 4) 
Defendant contended that the jury would be ad-
visory only (ibid, pp. 22-23, 33-34, 62-63), that 
the issue of the expulsion and reinstatement was 
properly tried by the court (ibid, p. 25) and that 
defendant had never made a demand for a jury 
in the case (ibid, p. 29). The court then suggested 
a stipulation by counsel to clarify the trial by the 
court of the issue as to exemplary damages for 
wrongful expulsion and to avoid repetition before 
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the jury of evidence theretofore presented to the 
court (ibid, pp. 9-12). After a recess, defendant 
refused to so stipulate unless the court first gave 
its decision as to malice and bad faith in the ex-
pulsion (ibid, pp. 36-37). 
On January 14, 1959, the court submitted a 
form of stipulation to counsel with the request that 
they notify the court by January 19 whether it 
\Vould be agreeable (R. 355-358). Plaintiffs agreed 
to the stipulation ( R. 359), but defendant declined 
to do so and consented to trial by jury "as if trial 
by jury had been a matter of right upon all issues 
not heretofore decided by the court" ( R. 360). On 
January 21, 1959, the court entered its Order as 
to Issues to be Submitted to Jury which is printed 
in full at pages 13 to 17 of the appendix to this 
brief. After a recital of the facts, the court stated 
in this order that the situation thus called for a 
ruling as to whether the defendant was entitled to 
have a jury trial of the issues (a) as to alleged 
malice or bad faith on the part of defendant's of-
ficers in bringing about the expulsion, and (b) as 
to whether exemplary damages should be awarded 
for such conduct and if so the amount of same. The 
court then ruled that defendant "is not now entitled 
to demand a jury trial" as to such issues and "that 
the court shall decide the aforesaid issues after 
evidence is completed in the case", and that only 
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the issues as to whether plaintiffs suffered actual 
damages as a result of the expulsion and \vhether 
they were entitled to exemplary damages for acts 
of defendant or its officers and agents subsequent 
to the expulsion should be submitted to the jury 
(appendix, pp. 16-17). 
The issues reserved for the jury were then 
tried, and the jury returned a verdict in defen-
dant's favor. Thereafter plaintiffs filed a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a 
n1otion for a new trial, and both motions were de-
nied. Concurrently with the filing of its order deny-
ing these motions, however, the court rendered a 
second Supplemental Memorandum of Decision in 
which it found among other things that the verdict 
was against the weight of the evidence; that plain-
tiffs had in fact suffered actual compensatory dam-
ages; that in expelling plaintiffs, defendant acted 
wilfully and maliciously; and that p'laintiffs were 
each entitled to recover nominal damages in the 
sum of $1.00, exemplary damages in the sum of 
$20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the sum of 
$7,000.00. The Second Supplemental Memorandum 
of Decision is dated May 2, 1959 and is printed on 
Pages 18 to 34 of the appendix of this brief. There-
after, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment were entered by the court in accordance 
with the original Memordandum of Decision and 
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the Second Supplemental Memorandum of Decision. 
From that judgment, defendant has appealed. The 
plaintiffs have cross appealed, chal'lenging the order 
denying their motions for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and for a new 'trial. The defendant 
has filed its opening brief. This brief is submitted 
in answer thereto and also in support of plaintiffs' 
cross appeal. 
INTRODUCTION 
We cannot and do not agree with the statement 
of facts contained in defendant's opening brief. De-
fendant states that probably most of the testimony 
and documentary ~vidence in this long and tedious 
case is surplusage. We believe, however, that a great 
deal of the 'testimony and evidence produced by de-
fendant was cumulative as well as surplusage. This 
is indicated by the fact that on direct examination 
the defendant cal'led 26 witnesses and the plaintiffs 
only 8 witnesses in the trial before the court, and 
that defendant called 18 witnesses and the plaintiff 
only 6 witnesses in the trial before the jury. The 
matter of needless accun1ulative evidence was refer-
red to many times during 'the trial by the court. 
Likewise, a great deal of the record is consumed 
by incessant and repetitious objections and argu-
ments by counsel for defendant which prolonged the 
trial and lengthened the record. No references to the 
transcript are necessary to support this statement, 
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inasnn1ch as it will be supported by turning at ran-
dum to allmost any volume of the transcript. The 
record is so voluminous that it is impossible to 1·efer 
to all rna terial parts and i't would be an in1 position 
on the justices of this court to ask them to read all 
such references. 
The plaintiffs were expelled after trials held 
in their absence on charges that they had violated 
various provisions of defendant's constitution and 
ritual. They were given no opportunity to call ·wit-
nesses or adduce evidence in their defense, or to 
cross examine witnesses cal'led against 'them, al-
though these rights were guaranteed to them by de-
fendant's own constitution. ( Exh. 53, Art. 18, Sec. 
2 (e)). The defendant seeks to justify this high-
handed p1·ocedure by asserting that plaintiffs had 
refused to stand trial. But the court below found 
to the contrary after a consideration of all of the 
evidence, hundreds of pages of which concern the 
union trial hearings and explain and supplement 
the transcript of the proceedings printed in the ap-
pendix to defendant's brief. In this connection~ the 
court found as follows in i'ts findings No. 13 to 17 
( R. 644-645) : 
13. That neither the petitioner nor the 
intervenor at any time refused to stand trial 
upon the said charges preferred against them; 
that neither of them at any time either by 
words or conduct consented to trial of said 
charges in his absence, but on the contrary 
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each of them informed the trial board of his 
desire to be present and to present evidence 
in refutation of such charges. 
14. That neither the petitioner nor the 
intervenor nor any person authorized to speak 
or act for them or either of them conducted 
himself in such a way as to justify the trial 
committee in trying them or either of 'them in 
absentia ; tha't the evidence presented as to 
conduct of the petitioner and intervenor and 
other persons a't open hearings conducted by 
the trial committee on June 3, 4, and 7, 1954, 
does not show any violence or threat of vio-
lence or any disturbance of the peace at said 
sessions of the trial committee; that police 
officers were present in the hearing room at 
each of said sessions and they were ready 
and able to prevent any violence or disturb-
ance of the peace; that protests and objec-
tions made by the petitioner and interve:qo~ 
at said open hearings were not so lacking in 
merit as to constitute or to be construed as 
a refusal to stand trial or as a waiver of trial 
or to justify the 'trial board in ordering them 
or either of them to be tried in absentia. 
15. That the trial committee wrong-
fully and without reasonable justification or 
excuse and ·without giving either the petition-
er or intervenor opportunity to be present or 
to hear the evidence against them or cross-
examine witnesses or to present evidence in 
their own behalf, proceeded to hear witnesses 
and to receive evidence produced by the Gen-
eral President and his counsel and thereafter 
rendered decisions declaring that each and an 
of the charges preferred against the petition-
er and intervenor, respectively, by the Gen-
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eral President wel'e true and that the peti-
tioner and intervenor should each be expelled 
from me1nbership in the respondent associ-
ation. 
16. That a purported tria 1 of the 
charges against the petitioner Nance was held 
in Room 1003 of the Statler Hotel in Los An-
geles on Thursday, June 10, 1954; that peti-
tioner was not present and had no notice or 
knowledge of the room where said trial was 
held nor any notice or knowledge of the ti1ne 
of said 'trial except by the notice shown at 
page 4 of Defendant's Exhibit 6 which was 
read at the sessi'on of the trial committee on 
June 7, 1954; that at said session and subse-
quent to the reading of said notice the chair-
man of the trial commi'tee announced that 
the petitioner and intervenor wou1ld be tried 
in absentia. 
17. That a purported trial of the 
charges against the intervenor Hanley was 
had by the trial committee on Tuesday, June 
8, 1954, as shown by Defendant's Exhibit 7 
herein; that the intervenor had no notice of 
such trial but had been notified by the trial 
committee as shown at page 3 of said Exhibit 
7 and at page 4 of said Exhibit 6 that his trial 
would be held Wednesday, June 9, 1954, or 
as soon thereafter as the trial of petitioner 
Nance was completed; that the purported trial 
of the charges against the intervenor was held 
on 'the day prior to the time specified in the 
notice read to him, and the intervenor had no 
notice or knowledge as 'to the time when or 
place where said trial was held except the 
notice above mentioned; that subsequent to 
the reading of said notice on June 7, 1954, 
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the chairman of the trial committee announc-
ed that the petitioner and intervenor would 
be tried in absentia. 
These findings are supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence as the foUowing statement of 
facts and summary of the evidence will show. 
FACTS PRECEDING UNION CHARGES 
Defendant is an international labor organiza-
tion having local unions throughout the United 
States and Canada. It is governed by a General 
Executive Council composed of ( 1) a general presi-
dent (who is the executive head of the organiza-
tion), (2) a general secretary-treasurer and (3) 
eleven general vice presidents. (Exh. 53, Art. 6). 
Although the defendant's constitution provides that 
these general officers shall be elected at a conven-
tion held every four years, no general officer has 
been originally so elected, each convention having 
silnply reelected the officers then in office who have 
been unopposed. ( N JT 3202-3205, 3511). Vacancies 
occurring between conventions have been filled by 
the general executive council, which has thus con-
stituted itself a self-perpetuating body. (ibid.). 
During all times material to this litigation, de-
fendant's general president was one Robert Byron 
( N JT 2860). He was a man of advanced years, be-
ing at the time of trial 78 years of age (ibid.). He 
had been connected with the defendant's organiza-
10 
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tion in one capacity or another for more than fifty 
years, and had held the office of general president 
since 1939 (NJT 35, 3202). Defendant's general 
secretary-treasurer was one Edward C a r 1 o u g h 
(ibid.). Its eleven general vice presidents were .A .. 
II. Cronin, Rene Schroeder, Moe Rosen, Marion 
Macioce, J. R. Dietz, Jacob Baer, J. 0. Renaud, G. 
Joseph Fitzgerald, James J. Ryan, James E. Brooks 
and C. D. Bruns (NJT 35-40). Of all of defendant's 
general officers, only Schroeder and Fitzgerald were 
residents of states West of the Missisippi RiYer, 
the former being a resident of Houston, Texas and 
the latter a resident of San Francisco (ibid.). 
Becoming dissatisfied with 'the policies and 
practices of the defendant, and with the dispropor-
tionate1ly large representation of the Northeastern 
part of the United States on defendant's general 
executive council, a group of members started a 
movement early in 1953, first, to retire Byron as 
general president at full pay, and secondly, to change 
the method of electing general vice presidents so 
that they would be elected by a referendum vote of 
local unions on a regional basis (NJT 134-137, Exh. 
12 to 15). The proponents of these changes proposed 
to endeavor to have them adopted at the defendant's 
next general convention scheduled to be held in 
August, 1954. If the changes were adopted, not only 
would Byron be removed as the active head of the 
11 
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defendant, but most of defendant's general vice 
presidents would be ousted from office. (ibid.). 
La'te in January, 1954, Byron summoned plain-
tiff Hanley to meet him in Miami ( N JT 41). At that 
thne Hanley was an international representative of 
defendant in charge of California, Nevada and Ari-
zona. Upon coming to Miami, Hanley met with By-
ron, Carlough and Cronin, first a't a meeting at 
which all three were present together with other 
officers and representatives of defendant, and sub-
sequent:ly with each of them separately. At the mee't-
ing at which all were present, he was interrogated 
at length by Cronin about the movement above de-
cribed. Hanley stated that he understood some local 
unions in his district were in favor of it. Cronin also 
told Hanley there were rumors that he (Hanley) 
intended to run against Byron for the office of gen-
eral presiden't and asked him if there was any truth 
in the rumors. Hanley denied that he had any in-
tention of doing so. He was told that the adminis-
tration (that is, the general officers then in office) 
would tolera'te no opposition at the coming conven-
tion ( N JT 44-48). Both Byron and Cronin were 
particular'ly bitter toward Carl Nichols (who was 
the business manager of Local Union 108, at Los 
Angeles, the largest of defendant's local unions in 
the United States) and 'toward John Fuller (who 
was the part 'time business agent of Local 371, an-
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other large local union in Los Angeles, and the ad-
ministrator of the Sheet Metal Workers Welfare 
Fund) whom they accused of having threatened to 
oppose the general officers at the convention by 
sponsoring the proposal to change the method of 
electing general vice presidents, opposing the re-
election of Byron, and otherwise opposing the exist-
ing regime (ibid. ) . 
After this meeting, Byron met with Hanley and 
requested him to prefer charges against Nichols 
and Fuller so as to prevent them from coming to the 
convention as delegates and even tried to induce 
Hanley to take $2,000.00 for the purpose of having 
Nichols assaulted (NJT 49-52). Cronin also met 
with Hanley and told him that no opposition would 
be tolerated at the convention, such as opposition 
to the reelection of Byron and the vice presidential 
amendment, and that if necessary to forestal11 such 
opposition all potential opponents would be expelled 
(NJT 52-58). Carlough also met with Hanley, and 
made statements of the same import (NJT 58-60, 
64-66). 
During the week of March 21, 1954, Hanley 
along with all other international representatives 
of the defendant, was in Washington to attend a 
session of the general executive council (NJT 71-72). 
On the 1ast day of the session, all of the international 
representatives were called before the council. At 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the start of the meeting, Cronin called upon one 
Roy James, an international representative from 
Texas, to give a report as to rumors he had heard. 
\Vhereupon James, pointing at Hanley, said that 
he heard rumors that somebody in California was 
supporting a move to change the vice presidents 
and to bring about a lot of changes at the conven-
tion (NJT 73-79, 749-753). At the close of the meet-
ing Hanley and Joseph Jarvis were asked to remain. 
Both were interrogated by Byron in reference to 
the plan to change the method of selecting vice presi-
dents. Byron stated : "We in tend to knock this thing 
out even if we have to expell everybody that's in-
vo1ved", and "so far as Nichols is concerned, you can 
look forward to his expulsion" ( N JT 79-80). Cronin 
rnet with Hanley on two occassions after the close 
of the session. In the first of these meetings, Cronin 
offered to act as a conciliator to make peace be-
tween Byron and Hanley if Hanley would divorce 
himself from the insurgent movement (NJT 81, 
114-116). In the second meeting, at which Nichols 
and several others were present, Cronin was shown 
a draft of a map indicating the regions from which 
the general vice presidents would be elected if the 
proposed amendment to the constitution were ad-
opted (NJT 116-120, 484-488). He expressed in 
no uncertain terms the prophecy that any person 
actively participating in the movement would be 
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expelled (ibid.) . Two days after the close of the 
meetings, Han1ley was discharged as inte1·national 
representative. (NJ.T 122-123, 2944). 
On April 3, 195L1, a convention of the delegates 
to the Tri-State Council was held at Phoenix, Ari-
zona (NJT 124). [The Tri-State Council is an or-
ganization composed of all local unions of the de-
fendant in the states of Arizona, California and 
Nevada. Delegates to the Tri-State Council are el-
ected by the various local unions in the three states 
and officers of the council are elected by the dele-
gates so chosen (NJT 123) .] At this convention 
a resolution was adopted urging the adoption at the 
next general convention of the resolution providing 
for the retirement of Byron as President Emeritus 
at full pay (NJT 131, Exh. 13). Hanley admittedly 
was the originator of this resolution (NJT 4056). 
The plan for the election of general vice presidents 
on a regional basis was discussed among the dele-
gates and a map showing the districts from which 
the general vice presidents would be e1lected was 
shown to the delegates (NJT 132). Although no 
formal action was taken as to this, it was agreed 
among the delegates that, on condition that Local 
Union No. 108 (of which Nichols was the business 
manager) would defray the cost, the resolution pro-
viding for the change of the method of selecting 
vice presidents and maps showing the regions from 
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which they would be elected should be sent to all 
local unions (NJT 5597). 
Hanley talked to the delegates at the meeting, 
discussed the maps and resolutions and reported 
on the discusion at the recent meeting of the general 
executive council in Washington. G. Joseph Fitz-
gerald, a general vice president who later served on 
the trial board, spoke in opposition to the resolu-
tions and stated that anyone who supported them 
\Vould only get in trouble (NJT 175-180, 5593-
5596). 
Within two weeks thereafter, between the 18th 
and 21st of April, 1954, Byron called a special ses-
sion of the General Executive Council at Washing-
ton, D. C. (NJT 3466, 3856, 5147). At this session, 
at which all of the general vice presidents were in 
attendance Byron announced that charges looking 
to the expulsion of Hanley, Nance, Nichols, Say and 
Fuller would be prepared and asked which of the 
general vice presidents would be agreeable to serv-
ing on a trial board (ibid.) . Cronin and one\'Qr~ two 
other general vice presidents declined to serve in 
that capacity (ibid.). 
Following the meeting of the General Execu-
tive Council, Byron journeyed to Los Angeles, and 
there spoke to, among others, Charles Willia:lns (a 
member of the Executive Board of Local Union No. 
88 in Las Vegas, Nevada) and to William Hanson (a 
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former business agent of Local Union No. 371 in 
Los Angeles). l-Ie told both of them that Hanley and 
Nance ·were going to be expelled, and that their ex-
pulsion was inevitable because of their participation 
to retire him (Byron) and to change the system of 
selecting General Vice Presidents (NJT 1754, 1756, 
1803). Thus, Hanson testified with respect to his 
conversation with Byron (NJT 1802-1803): 
A. Well, President Byron asked me to 
come with him in to another rom, where he 
could talk to me. So we stepped directly across 
the hall and into another room, and he said: 
'Well," he said -
Q. Who was present now? 
A. Just President Byron and myself. 
Q. All right. State the conversation. 
A. President Byron then said that -
He said: "Well, I found out al'l about the maps 
and the resolutions, and all this other stuff/' 
that Tom and Nick and them has been cir-
culating. And he seemed very upset about it. 
MR. SAND RACK: Move to 'Strike: "He 
seemed very upset about it." 
THE COURT: That will be stricken. 
A. And he asked me, he said: "First of 
all I want to come to an understanding with 
you." He said: "I understand you want to go 
back to work? Is that right?" and I said: 
"Yes, I do. I have to work." He said: "Well, 
I can see that you go back to work under cer-
tain conditions." He said: "First of all, are 
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you going to be an administration man, or 
aren't you?" and I said: "What do you mean 
by that?" He said: "Well, are you going along 
with the International, or are you going to 
go along with Tom Hanley and those others, 
and help support them?" So I said: "Well, 
I have to work." I said: "I don't want to get 
in to politics if I can keep out of it.'' ''Well, 
then," he said: "in a few days I'll have an 
affidavit drawn up that I want you to sign," 
and he said: "in the mean time you can go on 
back to work." He said: "I have already fired 
Hanley," and he said: "it looks like I'm going 
to have to expell him." He said: "I hate to 
do this, because he was the best International 
Representative I have ever had." And he said: 
"It just was a real shock to me to find out 
these things. That he was circulating this 
petition to retire me and so forth, and put in 
these new resolutions that would put in a new 
system of electing vice presidents." 
William's testimony was to the same effect. 
(NJT 1754 et. seq.). 
That Byron was interested in and had his field 
lieutenants busy combating the movement to amend 
the constitution is shown by the following report 
of his investigator Stetter regarding a proposed 
meeting of Local Union No. 108 to be held on April 
13, 1954 (NJT 5328, line 27 to 5329, line 13): 
"Murphy also advised that there will be 
a move made by Tom Hanley and his crowd 
to take over the meeting to be held Tuesday 
evening and to try to force General President 
Byron to resign. Murphy also adVised that 
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C. C. Artman, International Representati\·e, 
is lining up substantial opposition to any ac-
tion by Hanley; in Yiew of the temper of 
both sides there is a good possibility of Yio-
lence and even bloodshed .... O'Malley also 
advised that the members in Artman's ca1np 
are going to the meeting with the intention 
of fighting Hanley to the point that there 
will be btoodshed if need be. These men have 
informed O'Malley that they are going to ob-
ject to Hanley talking, and that when the 
Hanley faction tries to oppose their wishes 
they intend to resort to whatever force is 
necessary to see to it that Hanley does not 
get to talk.'' 
General Secretary-Treasurer Carlough was also 
interested in the plan to retire Byron and the maps 
designating the regions from which the vice presi-
dents would be elected, as Stetter admitted on cross-
examination that Carlough asked him if he had heard 
anything regarding the maps in Los Angeles im-
mediately after he returned to Washington on May 
2, 1954 (NJT 5350). 
THE CHARGES AND PURPORTED UNION TRIALS 
On May 15, 1954, Byron mailed to Hanley and 
Nance letters charging them with violations of var-
ious provisions of defendant's constitution and or-
dering them to stand trial before a trial board to 
be selected by him at the Statler Hotel in Los An-
geles, California. Hanley was directed to appear 
for trial on June 3, 1954 and Nance, along with three 
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other members, on the following day (Ex. 30, pp. 
21-28). Owing to his absence from Las Vegas (where 
he resided) Han1ley never received the letter pre-
ferring the charges against him ( N JT 181). He 
\vas, however, notified by Nichols by telephone that 
such charges had been preferred and saw a copy 
of them sometime around May 25, 1954 (NJT 181-
182, Exh. 16). Nance received the letter preferring 
the charges against him on or about May 18, 1954 
(NJT 1428, Ex. 49). 
Defendant maintained below and repeats in its 
brief in this court that the charges preferred against 
the plaintiffs were the result of: 
(a) Complaints made to Byron by Henry Ely 
and Ira Fulmor (the secretary of a contractors' as-
sociation and a Los Angeles contractor, respectively) 
of "shake downs and strikes called for extortionate 
purposes" ; and 
(b) Reports made to Byron by an investiga-
tor, one Grant Stetter, whom defendant alleges was 
hired as a result of the aforesaid complaint, to the 
effect that "Han'ley, Nichols, Fuller, and to a lesser 
extent Nance and Eugene Say" had engaged in 
"gross misconduct" including such matters as "in-
timidation of local union members, rigged union el-
ections, extortions and even physical coercion and 
intimidation of contractors". 
That defendant's contention in this behalf can-
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not be sustained is demonstrated by the fact that 
neither Nance nor Hanley vvas charged \vith "shake 
downs and strikes called for extortionate purposes". 
Nor was either of them charged with "intimidation 
of local union n1embers, rigged union elections, ex-
tortions, or physical coercion or intimidation of con-
tractors." The principal charge against Nance vvas 
that he had circulated certain bulletins critical of 
defendant's general officers accusing them of mis-
using union funds for gambling and other improper 
purposes. He was also accused of refusing to turn 
over upon demand certain union books and records 
and an automobile (Exh. 47). But nowhere in the 
charges against Nance is any reference to shake 
downs, etc., as claimed by defendant. Nor is there 
any reference to any such matters in the charges 
against Hanley. Indeed, the charges against Hanley, 
which are set forth on pages 56 to 60 of the ap-
pendix to defendant's brief, are of such nature that, 
while they might justify his discharge from the 
position of international representative, would not 
justify his expulsion from membership in the de-
fendant union. As for the reports of the investiga-
tor Stetter, there is good reason to believe that he 
was employed, not to conduct an impartial and un-
biased investigation as defenedant would have the 
court believe, but to obtain evidence to justify plain-
tiffs' expulsion which defendant had already deter-
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n1ined to effect. This is shown not only by the fact 
that as early as April 1954, Byron had announced 
at a special executive council meeting that charges 
would be preferred against plaintiffs, whereas the 
investigator did not make his final report until May 
8, 1954, but also by the following excerpts from the 
investigator's reports (NJT 5346): 
"Mr. John O'Mal1ey, our associate in Los 
Angeles, California was also contacted by tele-
phone and he advised that reasonable progress 
is being made to establish shake down activi-
ties by Nichols. He was instructed to handle 
these interviews which were already sche-
duled, but to concentrate on obtaining affi-
davits or signed statements concerning Han-
ley's illegal activities." 
Although prepared by defendant's general 
counsel, the charges were, especially in the case of 
Hanley, framed in the most general terms con-
ceivable. As said before, Hanley never received the 
charges mailed to hhn by Byron, although he did 
see and obtain a copy of them indirectly sometime 
between May 25, and May 27, 1954. Upon learning 
of the charges, he wrote a letter to Byron on May 
29, 1954 (Exh. 17) requesting a continuance. The 
letter read in part as follows: 
"Not having received a copy of the 
charges, due to the fact that I have not been 
in Las Vegas for more than two weeks and 
my family has been on vacation, I would na-
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tura'lly be unable to defend such charges at 
the tin1e and place designated by you. I would, 
therefore, request that you as General Presi-
dent, in accordance with Article 18, Section 
3 of the International Constitution and Ri-
tual, furnish me with a copy of said charges 
by forwarding the same to me at Post Office 
Box 786, Las Vegas, Nevada, or to the ~~lay­
fair Hotel, Los Angeles, California, and upon 
receipt of the same I will be governed by the 
provisions of our International Constitution 
relative to charges and trials by general of-
ficers." 
A copy of this letter was sent to defendant's 
genera1 secretary-treasurer and to each of its gen-
eral vice-presidents. 
In the meanwhile, Byron had appointed three 
of defendant's general vice presidents to serve as a 
trial board to try plaintiffs on the charges he had 
preferred against them. They were Moe Rosen, Rene 
Schroeder and G. Joseph Fitzgerald. Rosen was chos-
en as chairman of the board. 
On June 2, 1954, Rosen replied to the letter 
quoted from above by a telegram reading as fol-
lows (Exh. 19): 
"Your trial will proceed at 10:00 A.M. 
June 3, 1954 at the Statler Hotel , Los An-
geles, California, as stated in notice sent you 
by registered mail under date of May 15, 
1954. Objections raised in your letter to Ro-
bert Byron dated May 29, 1954, may be sub-
mitted by you at your trial. 
Moe Rosen, 
Chairman Trial Board" 
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On June 3, 1954, Hanley and Nance appeared 
at the room where the trial was to be held. The room 
was approximately 16 by 20 feet in size, the larger 
part of which was consumed by tables (NJT 2326). 
\Vhen Nance and Hanley arrived the members of 
the trial board, as well as several newspaper report-
ers and a number of spectators variously estimated 
as numbering approximately 10 to 25, were present 
( N JT 2330) . Three police officers in plain clothes, 
including one Captain Joseph E. Stephens, were also 
present ( N JT 2334). As testified to by Stephens, 
''there was considerable discussion among the people 
in the back of the room. It was not loud but it was 
audible." (NJT 2336). At the start of the trial 
Hanley renewed his application for a continuance 
( Exh. 4, 20. 78). The motion was denied ( Exh. 4, 
76). He also presented several written applications 
for a clarification of the charges against him. This 
application was never acted upon (Exh. 18). 
The chairman of the trial board refused to 
start the trial until the room was cleared of all 
persons except Hanley, his counsel Eugene Vaughn, 
the prosecutor Ernest Murphy, the n1embers of the 
trial board, and two short-hand reporters. ( Exh. 4). 
The spectators left during the morning session, and 
the trial got under way by the chairman reading 
charges and Hanley's objections and requests (Exh. 
4, 67-83.). The trial then adjourned for lunch 
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(ibid.). At the afternoon session Fuller, Nance and 
Nichols, as well as Hanley, were present. The chair-
man refused to proceed until the first three indiYi-
duals left the romn ( Exh. 4, 84), and finally he ad-
journed the trial ( Exh. 4, 111). 
Nance's trial, as well as the trials of three 
othe1· union members, was scheduled for the follo\v-
ing morning on June 4, 1954. Although Nance was 
present, his case was never called for trial ( Exh. 
5). Instead the trial board again recessed the trial 
because the spectators present failed to heed the 
chairman's request that the room be cleared of all 
but the accused, his counsel, etc. (ibid.). 
The trial board reconvened on Monday, June 
7, 1954. At this time the chairman read into the 
record notices to the effect that Fuller would stand 
trial on June 7, 1954, that Nichols' trial would fol-
low that of Fuller, that Nance would be tried on 
June 8th and that Hanley would be tried on June 
9th ( Exh. 6) . These notices were prepared over the 
weekend by Murphy, attorney Mulhdlland and the 
trial board after a conference with Byron under the 
following circumstances as testified to by Murphy 
(NJT 4742): 
"Well, the trial had been going very bad-
ly, and, in confering with Mr. Byron, I went 
to Mr. Fitzgerald and said that we would have 
to get Monday's procedings off on a better 
foot. I pointed out some errors they had been 
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making in not reading some of these things 
into the record. They therefore agreed to pre-
pare the notices which are under question. Mr. 
Schroeder and Mr. Rosen made sure in my 
presence that they had the proper documents 
to go to the proper people, and that I went 
in with them, or behind them, and saw them 
pass these documents out, and I knew they 
had the right documents in their hands, and 
that is the reason that I insisted at the open-
ing of the procedure that these documents be 
read in to the record.'' 
After reading the notices in to the record, the 
chairman recessed the trials when the spectators 
failed to leave the trial room ( Exh. 6, 17). He re-
convened the session to announce that the accused 
members would be tried in absentia. ( Exh. 6, 19). 
At no time did the number of spectators in the 
room exceed 25 ( N JT 2330, 2332, 2340, 2345, 2352). 
At no time did the trial board ask the police present 
to clear the room, although police officers were pre-
sent during all three days when the so called trials 
were in session. This is made clear by the following 
testimony of Captain Stephens (NJT 2440): 
BY THE COURT: ... referring to the 
trial hearings on the 3rd, 4th and 7th of Jan-
uary . . . of June. Was any request made 
of you by the chairman or any member of 
the trial board to quell any disturbance in 
the trial room? 
ANSWER: My answer, your Honor, 
was that no one asked me to remove any one 
or quell any disturbance. 
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THE COURT: Was any request made 
of you to silence any boistrousness in the 
room? 
ANSWER: No sir. 
THE COURT: Was any request made 
of you to take any action? I mean any request 
made by any member of the trial board to take 
any action? 
ANSWER: I testified, I think, your 
Honor, that the point, the question was raised 
by the chairman as to whether -
THE COURT: Well, but was any re-
quest 1nade to you? 
ANSWER: No sir. 
THE COURT: To do anything? 
ANSWER: No sir. 
Stephens also testified that he was not request-
ed by anyone to be present at any of the sessions 
(NJT 2351-2352). 
Neither Nance nor Hanley was responsible for 
the presence of the spectators. (NJT 304, 1448). All 
of them were apparently members of defendant's 
Local Union No. 108 and hence interested in the 
trials, especially in view of the fact that their local 
had recently been taken over by Byron for the Inter-
national (NJT 2348-2350, 5619, 5637-5638). De-
fendant refers to the testimony of John Fuller re-
garding a purported conspiracy to sabatoge the 
trials, and states that his testimony was evi-
dently not credited by the court. It is clear from the 
court's findings that it did not give any credence 
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to his testimony, and as a matter of fact, his testi-
Inony was so contradictory and he was so completely 
discredited in his cross-examination that his entire 
testimony could be completely ignored. 
The evidence shows that the trial board was 
not impartial, as shown by the testimony of Murphy 
quoted herein and the appointment of Fitzgerald 
who had stated at the Tri-State Council that any 
one supporting the resolutions for amendment of 
the constitution would get in trouble. Also, through-
out the trial the members of the trial board con-
ferred constantly with Byron who had not only pre-
ferred the charges but also had appointed the trial 
board. Thus, Schroeder testified that the members 
of the tria1l board me't with Byron, Attorney Mulhol-
land and other officers when he first arrived in 
Los Angeles for the trials and that they would meet 
in Byron's room every evening after the trial hear-
ings and go to dinner together ( N JT 3965-3970). 
On June 8, 1954, the members of the trial board 
1net the accused members in the lobby of the Statler 
Hotel and offered to take Nichols to the trial room 
to stand trial, if he would go alone ( N JT 3909). 
The offer was not extended to either Nance or 
Hanley (ibid) . The trial board then proceeded to 
try Hanley and Nance in absentia ( Exh. 7 and Exh. 
10). Although Han1ey had been notified to appear 
for trial on June 9, 1954, he was actually tried on 
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June 8, 1954. Nance had never been called for trial, 
and although he was notified that his trial would 
be on June 8th, he was tried in absentia on June 10, 
1954 (Exh. 10). 
THE UNION APPEALS AND EFFORTS FOR 
REDRESS IN COURT 
Thereafter, on June 29, 1954, the trial board 
rendered decisions finding each of the plaintiffs 
guilty of all of the charges which Byron had pre-
felTed against them. (Exh. 30, pp. 37, 53). From 
these decisions plaintiffs appealed. Under the pro-
cedure prescribed by defendant's constitution, ap-
peals from the decisions wou1l'd ordinarily lie, first, 
to the general president, secondly, to the general ex-
ecutive council, and thirdly, to defendant's general 
convention (Exh. 53, Art. 19). Since Byron had 
preferred the charges against the plain tiffs he dis-
qualified himself from hearing their appeals, which 
were referred to the general executive council (Exh. 
26). In order that they might not lose their chance 
to appeal to the general convention which was sche-
du1ed to be held in August, and because several 
members of the general executive council had ex-
pressed themeselves as being biased and prejudiced 
against 'the plaintiffs (NJT 386-388), plaintiffs 
waived the right to have their appeals heard by the 
general executive council (NJT 389). The appeals 
were accordingly referred to the grievance and ap-
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peals committee. This committee, like all committees 
of the general convention, was appointed by Byron 
as general president. (Exh. 53~ Art. 7, Sec. 7). Han-
ley appeared before the committee representing not 
only himself, but also Nance, who was unable to 
attend the convention (NJT 1456). He endeavored 
to introduce evidence refuting the charges preferred 
against plaintiffs and showing that the decision of 
the trial board was erroneous. The committee, how-
ever, refused to receive any new evidence and insist-
ed that the appeals be heard on the record of the 
trials held in absentia (NJT 403 et seq). There-
after, the committee recon1mended to the conven-
tion that the decisions of the trial board be affirmed 
and the appeals denied (Ex. 30, pp. 58-61). Al-
though Hanley had been promised the opportunity 
of addressing the convention in support of the ap-
peals, this privilege was finally denied (NJT 412-
414). The recommendations of the committee were 
accepted and adopted by the convention by a stand-
ing vote, seven delegates dissenting in the case of 
Hanley's appeal (Exh. 30, pp. 63-66). It may be 
noted that under the defendant's constitution, the 
seven dissenting votes may have been sufficient to 
call for a reversal since the delegate or delegates of 
each local union were en ti tied to cast one vote for 
each fifty members in the union electing them (Exh. 
53, Art. 7, Sec. 2a). 
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It was plain that the grievance and appeals 
comn1ittee was not an unbiased tribunal. In this 
connection Burk, the chairman of the committee, 
told Hanley in the presence of several persons that 
the "skids were greased", the committee having re-
ceived orders to deny the appeals, and that there 
was nothing the commi tee could do about it ( N JT 
417-418, 1638, 1825). Moulder, another member 
of the committee, made statements to the same ef-
fect ( N JT 442). There was much evidence to shovv 
that delegates were intimidated and pressure was 
exerted on them to affirm the expulsions, as shown 
by the testimony of de'legate White (NJT 2073-
2076). And this despite the fact that defendant's 
general counsel stated that "they had nothing on 
Hanley" ( N JT 392-394, 1822). 
Following their expulsion, plaintiffs brought 
mandamus proceedings in Nevada to compel defen-
dant to reinstate them. Service of process up defen-
dant was attempted to be made by serving the offi-
cers of several of the local unions in Nevada, but 
on defendant's motion the service was quashed by 
the trial court on the ground that the persons served 
were not agents of the defendant. The action of 
the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Nevada. See Hanley v. Sheet Metal Workers Int. 
Assn., 293 P. 2d 544. Thereafter defendant seduously 
kept all of its officers, international representatives 
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and other agents from entering the State of Nevada 
and plain tiffs were unable to effect service of pro-
cess upon it. This proceeding was then brought in 
Utah during 1957 and valid service of process upon 
defendant was effected. 
DAMAGES AFTER EXPULSION -
THE JURY TRIAL 
The foregoing is a greatly condensed summary 
of the evidence introduced on the issues tried by the 
court sitting without a jury. Following the court's 
decision that plaintiffs had been wrongfully ex-
pelled, the issues reserved by the court's order for 
trial by jury came on to be heard, and the following 
is a summary of the evidence adduced at this trial. 
In the states of Arizona, California, Nevada 
and Utah, the several 1ocal unions of defendant 
operate what is known as a referral or clearance 
system for employment. Under this system, con-
tractors and other employers desiring to hire sheet 
n1etal workers call the business agent of the local 
union who then orally or in writing refers or 
"clears" available men to them. Without such a 
referral or C1learance it is as a practical matter 
impossible for an unemployed sheet metal work-
er to obtain or retain employment. ( JT 28-30). In-
deed, if a sheet metal worker obtained employment 
from a union contractor or an employer without such 
a referral or clearance the local business agent 
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would likely call a strike against the offending 
employer, or the other union emp1oyees would likely 
walk out en masse. This is shown, in addition to other 
evidence, by the recording of a conversation which 
took place between W. J. Fields, the business agent 
of defendant's Phoenix, Arizona local union, and 
the plaintiff Nance in December, 1956 (JT 2642) 
as transcribed in Exh. 188, as follows: 
MR. NANCE: How's the work silua-
tion, Bill? 
MR. FIELDS: It has not been very good 
down here now. It has been pretty fair. I've 
got all the local boys back to work at the pre-
sent time, anyway - at least for the next 
few days, so far as I know. 
MR. NANCE: Well, Es1ten, I want to 
stay around here for a while and look for a 
job, and suppose I find my own job, win you 
give me a clearance? 
MR. FIELDS: No. 
MR. NANCE: Why not? If I find my 
own job, Bill? 
MR. FIELDS: Find your own job in 
one of our shops - in one of my shops? 
MR. NANCE: Anywhere I can go to 
work for you. 
MR. FIELDS: Do you have a card? 
MR. NANCE: No. You know I was ex-
pelled by the In tern a tional. 
MR. FIELDS: Now you know we have 
no business of clearing out anybody like that. 
If you find an employer who will take you, 
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why then he can go ahead and take you. 
That's up to him. 
MR. NANCE: Well, I'm out of a job and 
I went out at one of the union shops, Bill, 
and he said I could go to work if I could get 
cleared with the union. 
MR. FIELDS: Who told you a story like 
that? 
MR. NANCE: A fellow who worked at 
the shop right behind the Southwest 'Manu-
facturing Company. 
MR. FIELDS : Right behind the South-
west? 
MR. NANCE: Southwest Manufactur-
ing Company. 
MR. FIELDS: You mean Frank Har-
monsen, do you? 
MR. NANCE: Yes, Frank Harmon-
sen's Shop. 
MR. FIELDS: Oh. Who were you talk-
ing to? 
MR. NANCE: I talked to the foreman, 
a fellow by the name of Platt. What's his 
name? 
MR. FIELDS: Dick Platt? 
MR. NANCE: Dick Platt. 
MR. FIELDS: Oh! Well, those guys, 
of course, they- Well, now, Howard Wall, 
I talked to the foreman there this morning and 
I got some guys coming in from Glendale. 
That's how we get mixed up. Now, I talked 
to him just this morning and I got some fel-
lows getting laid off from Glendale here- it 
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will be a couple or three days - and he is go-
ing to take them, now that's the way they get 
all mixed up. Dick Platt has done that before. 
These guys come in and he says, "Oh, yes, 
I'll take you." That's his way of saying, "Well, 
if you get straightened out with the union, 
why that's all right.'' 
MR. NANCE: If I get a clearance out 
of the union, if I have to have a clearance out 
of your office, now if I find a job in a union 
shop, will you give me a clearance if they'll 
hire me? 
MR. FIELDS : It depends here on how 
my men situation is. If I got men available 
here for 'em. Listen, these shops have no God 
damn business, so far as I'm concerned, I 
mean, I don't give a shit. I won't even furnish 
them any men if they are going to pick their 
men off the street. Why they can get them 
that way. I'H take my men out of the shop. 
They can get them off the street. Otherwise, 
why they call my office for the men because 
that's in the contract and we agreed to furn-
ish the1n men. If we can't furnish them men, 
we've got a certain specified time, then they 
can get their men where they want to. 
MR. NANCE: I don't see any reason 
why you wouldn't clear me out if a union shop 
will hire me. Personally, that's what I want 
to know, if you will kindly give me a job. I've 
got to know, Bill. I've got to have a job and 
I've got a family to support. 
MR. FIELDS: Well, it depends here, 
Troy, on how my situation is. This is a slow 
time here for us, you see, than normally is. 
We are busier this winter than we have ever 
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been, but it is a slow time of year. If we were 
rushed and pushed for men and I had no men 
being out of work and none of my members 
out of work, we put our permit men out, you 
see, we would put men out on permit, put 
them out that way, but when I got my mem-
bers out of work, I'm not putting any permit 
men out, putting guys ou't like that. It has 
been done before here. I mean, when the shop 
goes ahead, why that's their own liability. If 
they want to go ahead and do that, why they 
can go ahead, because I'm not going to answer 
for what the rest of the men in the shop are 
going to do if they pick up and walk out or 
what they do. If a man comes in without a 
clearance or anything from me, why they 
probably will. That's the way they do. But 
if I got men out of work and if I can furnish 
the men and if they are called up here from 
me and ask me to get men, from me, and I 
can furnish 'em, why then our own union 
members, why then they have no business of 
telling anybody. I've told them that before on 
account of this right to work law. 
MR. NANCE: Have you told 'them they 
had to hire the men through the union hall? 
MR. FIELDS: Why it's in the contract. 
It's in their contract, brother, its written right 
in there. 
MR. NANCE: Okeh, Bill, I'll see you 
later then. 
MR. FIELDS: Y a! 
Prior to the decision of the trial board, Byron 
telephoned C. E. Vaughn, the business agent of 
Local Union No. 88 in Las Vegas, Nevada, and told 
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him that unless he kept Hanley and Nance fro1n 
working he would be expelled. Vaughn asked him 
the grounds on which he would be expelled, and 
Byron replied: "Never mind. I have more power 
than Stalin or Hitler ever had. The lawyers \vill 
find the grounds" (JT 26-27). Byron also gave 
similar instructions to Chas. Williams, acting busi-
ness agent of Local Union No. 88 (JT 302-304). 
Vaughn had previously been threatened by Leon 
Reliford, one of defendant's international represent-
atives, with expulsion if he permitted plaintiffs to 
work. ( JT 24). Vaughn attended defendant's con-
vention in Montreal, Canada in August, 1954, and 
while there he was again told by Byron that he was 
not to permit Nance or Han'ley to work ( JT 28-29). 
When Vaughn returned from the convention, 
Nance was employed by the Maslow Heating & Cool-
ing Company in Las Vegas, Nevada ( JT 34) . 
Vaughn immediately dispatched a le'tter to Maslow 
calling attention to the fact that Nance had been 
expelled and insisting that he be not permitted to 
work (Exh. 147, JT 621-623). Copies of this letter 
were posted in the shops of all employers in the Las 
Vegas area (JT 37). Thereafter Vaughn refused to 
issue referrals or work clearances to either Nance or 
Hanley and they were unable to keep work (JT 30, 
627, 632, 1029). In January, 1955, the members of 
Local Union No. 88 voted 82 to 2 to accept Hanley's 
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dues (Nance was last a member of Local Union No. 
371) and to refer or clear both of the plaintiffs to 
jobs. (JT 32). Vaughn issued referrals or work 
clearances to both Nance and Hanley from that 
ti1ne until August 16, 1955, when he was removed 
as business agent for Byron for failure to carry 
out Byron's orders regarding the plaintiffs (JT 32, 
55, 39). During this time plaintiffs were working, 
but upon Vaughn's removal both were discharged 
from their employment (JT 1070, 1076-1077). 
Walter Vickers succeeded Vaughn as business 
agent of Local Union No. 88, and he was called to 
Chicago and received instructions from Byron. ( JT 
54, 2059-2060). Charles Biggert became business 
agent after Vickers, and he was succeeded by Ernest 
Newman (JT 54). None of these business agents 
would issue work clearances to plaintiffs, and from 
the time of Vaughn's removal to the time of trial 
plaintiffs were unable to obtain work as sheet metal 
\vorkers in the Las Vegas area where they resided 
(JT 652, 656-657, 1151, 1210-1211). The record 
contains a great deal of testimony by both of the 
plaintiffs and other witnesses that the plaintiffs 
made numerous applications for work but were re-
fused employment because they were expelled mem-
bers of the union. 
In an attempt to show that plaintiffs suffered 
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no damage as a result of their expulsion, defendant 
offered the testimony of seve1·al contractors that 
they refused to employ plaintiff because they were 
personally disliked by them. Defendant also at-
tempted to show that the referral or work clearance 
was not in use, and apparently triad to prove that 
a union card had no monetary value. Fields, the 
business agent at Phoenix, testified that a work re-
ferral was not necessary in his area, but his testi-
mony was completely discredited by the recording 
of his own words to Nance previously quoted ( JT 
2202-2203, 2222-2223). And it is very significant 
that defendant did not call either Vickers or Big-
gert, the two men best able to testify to the referral 
practices in Las Vegas during the long period when 
plaintiffs were unable to obtain work. Also, the 
testimony regarding Byron's instructions to Vaughn 
and Williams not to permit the plaintiffs to work was 
absolutely uncontradicted as Byron was also not 
called as a witness, although he was certainly "avail-
able". 
Nance was compelled to accept employment as 
a service station attendant (JT 730-731), and Han-
ley was constrained to support himself and his fain-
ily by selling his possessions and by borrowing funds 
(JT 1292-1294). The average earnings of sheet 
metal workers in the Las Vegas area during the 
years 1954 to 1958 were approximately $9,000.00 a 
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year (JT 566, 1236-1239). In contrast, Nance's 
earnings after his expulsion were only as follows 
(JT 732-735): 
J u1y 1 to December 31, 1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
$1,938.67 
3,778.11 
506.86 
3,351.00 
2,653.12 
Hanley's earnings after his expulsion were on1y 
as follows ( JT 1233-1234) : 
July 1 to December 31, 1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
$ 100.00 
4,634.30 
500.00 
600.00 
1,626.50 
The defendant resorted to a strategy of delay 
and confusion in the trial before the jury. What 
'"~Yas said in the introduction regarding incessant 
and repetitious objections and arguments of coun-
sel was doubly true during the jury trial. By refer-
ence to any volume of the transcript it will be seen 
that the constant objections, arguments and un-
necesary proffers of testimony by defendant's coun-
sel caused a veritable parade of the jury in and out 
of the court room, and the court com men ted on this 
situation ( JT 1963). Despite the uncontradicted 
evidence and the natural and inevitable damage re-
sulting from the loss of union membership, the jury 
returned a verdict that plaintiffs had suffered no 
actual damage whatsoever. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS WERE WRONGFULLY EXPELLED FROM 
MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANT UNION AND THAT 
THEIR EXPULSIONS vVERE NULL AND VOID. 
POINT IB 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDIKG 
THAT PLAINTIFFS' REMEDIES ON APPEAL DID 
NOT CURE THE DEFECTS OF THE TRIAL BOARD 
PROCEEDINGS. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT AND ITS OFFICERS 
WERE MALICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND UNREASON-
ABLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREFERRING 
OF CHARGES, TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL 
THROUGH THE UNION PROCEEDING. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING NOM-
INAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AND 
THE POWER TO ENFORCE THE WRIT OF lVIAN-
DATE, AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH 
SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAIN-
TIFFS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY FEES. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN TAXING CER-
TAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
In presenting our argument in this brief, we 
shall first consider and answer the arguments ad-
vanced by defendant in support of its appeal, and 
then present our argument in support of plain-
tiffs' cross appeal. 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS WERE WRONGFULLY EXPELLED FROM 
MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANT UNION AND THAT 
THEIR EXPULSIONS WERE NULL AND VOID. 
The defendant argues that plaintiffs were right-
fully expelled by defendant after trials held in their 
absence. It bases this argument on the contention 
that plaintiffs deliberately refused to stand trial, 
and to that end wilfully disrupted the proceedings 
before the trial board on June 3, 4 and 7, 1954, 
to such an extent that their trials could not get un-
derway. The court below found against that con-
tention. To overturn this finding, defendant points 
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only to the transcript of the proceedings before the 
trial board the days mentioned (Exhibits 4, 5 and 
6, which it has printed as an appendix to its brief). 
In so doing, defendant has chosen to disregard the 
fact that the finding was based not only on that 
transcript, but also on volumes of oral and docu-
mentary evidence in which everything that took 
place before the trial board was fully canvassed and 
explored. The findings of the court below are am ply 
supported by this evidence, and defendant has failed 
to show the contrary. Indeed, it cannot do so. 
But even on the basis of the defendant's own 
brief, and the transcript of the proceedings before 
the trial board on which defendant relies, it is mani-
fest that defendant's argument cannot be sustained. 
An analysis of the transcript shows that plaintiffs 
did no more than request ( 1) a continuance, ( 2) 
a bill of particulars clarifying the charges preferred 
against them, (3) the right to be confronted by 
their accuser and ( 4) that they be tried in what 
they considered to be the proper venue. All of these 
requests were reasonable, were properly made at 
the start of plaintiffs' trial, and under the provi-
sions of defendant's own constitution should have 
been gran ted. 
Certainly there was nothing improper in plain-
tiffs' request for a continuance. Section 2 (j) of 
Article 18 of defendant's constitution (which by 
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Section 3 (c) of the same Article is made applic .. 
able to trials held before general officers) provides: 
Either party shall be granted a postpon-
ment of the trial for a reasonable period of 
time if valid reasons are pre sen ted to the trial 
committee or the trial committee may post-
pone the trial on its own motion for not more 
than thirty days. 
Defendant by its own evidence claims that it had 
employed lawyers and investigators and had spent 
n1onths in assembling evidence for use in the pre-
paration of the charges preferred against plaintiffs. 
Yet Hanley saw a copy of the charges against him 
only 10 days before he was ordered to stand trial, 
v.Thile Nance received a copy of the charges against 
hi1n only 16 days before he was scheduled to go on 
trial. In these circumstances, plaintiffs' requests 
for a continuance were plainly reasonable. 
Nor were the requests for a bill of particulars 
clarifying the charges unreasonable or in any way 
in1proper. Section 1 (b) of Article 18 of the con-
stitution provides that all charges shall: 
( 3) contain a detailed statement of the facts 
out of which such charges originated; 
( 4) contain specific reference to Article, Sec-
tion and Paragraph of the constitution, 
the policies, decisions, laws, rules or regu-
lations which it is alleged have been or 
are being viola ted; 
( 5) state the nature of the violations claimed. 
The charges preferred against plaintiffs, particu-
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larly those preferred against Hanley, most certain-
ly do not comply with the foregoing requirements, 
for they do not contain a detailed statement of 
facts nor in fact any statement of facts out of 
which the charges originated. Typical of the charges 
preferred against Hanley are the following: 
1. Bringing the labor movement and 
this association into disrepute in violation of 
Section 17 (a) of Article Ten ( 10) and Sec-
tion 1 (a) of Article Seventeen ( 17) of the 
International Constitution by: 
(c) Having knowledge of extortion and 
attempted extortion on the part of certain 
members of Local Union 108 and Local Union 
88 and not reporting the same to the general 
president and failing to take any steps to pre-
vent its further occurrence. 
2. Failing and refusing to cooperate 
with and defying the duly constituted officers 
of the Los Angeles Building Trades Council 
and representatives of other bona fide labor 
organizations while acting as International 
Representative having supervision over Local 
Union 371, to such extent that Sheet Metal 
Workers International Association and its 
affiliated local unions are completely discre-
dited in the labor movement in the Los An-
geles area, which conduct is in violation of 
Section 17 (a) of Article 10 and Section 1 (a) 
of Article 17 of the International Constitu-
tion. 
Clearly, the foregoing charges (and they are typical 
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of the others) fail to meet the requirements of the 
constitution. Hanley's written demand for bill of 
particulars ( Exh. 18) was, therefore, clearly pro-
per, and he did right in pressing for it before the 
trial board. 
Likewise, there was nothing improper in Han-
ley's asking that the charges be prosecuted by the 
person who preferred them, Robert Byron. Section 
1 (c) of Article 17 of the constitution provides that 
it shall be an expellable offense for one to fail to 
appear as a prosecuting witness after filing charges 
against an officer or member, or to present all facts 
and evidence to support any charges so filed. Sec-
tion 2 (h) of Article 18 provides, "Should those who 
preferred the charges fail to appear after due no-
tice, the charges shall be dismissed without preju-
dice." This provision is made applicable to trials 
before general officers by Section 3 (c) of Article 
18. The constitution provides in two places that 
when a member is tried before general officers, he 
shall be entitled to be represented by a good stand-
ing member as his counsel (Section 3 (b) and Sec-
tion 4 of Article 18) , but no such right is accorded 
to those preferring the charges. 
Finally, Hanley cannot be criticized for asking 
that his trial be held in Las Vegas, Nevada, the 
city where his local union has its office. In this 
connection, Section 3 (a) of Article 18 provides, 
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"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the trial 
shall be held at the point where the office of such 
local union or council is located ... " True, defen-
dant contends that this provision is inapplicable be-
cause the charges were not filed with the local union. 
This contention is of doubtful validity. Section 3 (a) 
of Article 18 provides further that, "If charges were 
initially filed with the general president as provided 
in Section 4 of this Article, he shall notify the ac-
cused and those preferring the charges in writing, 
by registered mail, of the time and place of such 
trial." The constitution makes provision for filing 
charges only with a local union or with the general 
president. Here the charges were not filed with the 
general president but by him. A literal reading of 
the constitution would seem to require that in such 
case the charges be filed with a local union. The 
plaintiffs' construction of the constitution is there-
fore at least as tenable as that urged by defendant. 
In any case, we submit there was nothing censur-
able in Hanley's asking to be tried in the place of 
his residence. 
An examination of Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 dis-
closes that Hanley at no time refused to stand trial. 
On the contrary, he expressed emphatically and re-
peatedly a desire to stand trial ( Exh. 4, pp. 29-30, 
48, 55-60, 100, 102-103, 112, Exh. 5, p. 117). At 
page 117 of Exh. 5, quoted at page 14 of defendant's 
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brief, he said, "I desire to continue my trial if the 
General President would comply with the Consti-
tution and filing of the charges properly," and in 
the speech quoted at page 15 of defendant's brief 
he again stated his desire for a proper trial by 
saying, "I will submit my case, and I will defend 
Nichols and Fuller before anybody, any impartial 
Board. I will submit it to this union." As for Nance, 
he took so little part in the proceedings before the 
trial board that there is nothing from which it can 
be even argued that he refused to stand trial. 
On June 7 Hanley was notified that he was to 
stand trial on June 9, and Nance was notified that 
he would stand trial after the conclusion of the trial 
of Fuller probably on June 8. ( Exh. 6, pp. 4 and 5). 
It is undisputed that neither Nance nor Hanley 
refused to stand trial on the dates they were thus 
summoned to appear, unless their failure to accept 
what defendant has termed the "last chance offer" 
can be considered to be a refusal to stand trial. We 
submit that it cannot, because for one reason the 
offer was not extended either to Nance or to Han-
ley. The so called "last chance offer" was made on 
the morning of June 8 when the trial board met the 
accused in the lobby of the hotel. The circumstances 
under which the alleged offer was made were ex-
plained by defendant's witness Schroeder as fol-
lows (NJT 3909): 
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Q. All right. I want you to state what 
happened from the time you went down in 
the lobby. Describe to the court what you ob-
served and what you heard and what you 
said. 
A. I'll have to make an explanation. 
Mr. Nichols was unable to attend the Mon-
day trial and he had not been notified that he 
would be tried in absentia, I'm reasonably 
sure. 
Q. All right. 
A. And our purpose was then to invite 
1ll1·. Nichols to, or rather to ascertain as to 
zchether he was agreeable to standing trial, 
or zchat his intentions were. 
Q. All right. Now state what happened. 
A. (continuing) With respect to the 
trial, we'll say. 
Q. All right, State what happened, then, 
when you went down in the elevator. 
A. Mr. Rosen was there at that time. 
Asked Mr. Nichols if he was ready to stand 
trial in an orderly way. 
Q. All right. 
A. Under the rules of procedure. And 
he indicated that - he said, yes he would. 
And he wanted to know where the trial would 
be. 
Q. Is this Mr. Nichols talking now, Mr. 
Schroeder? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
A. And Mr. Rosen said, "Well, if you'll 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- we'll not tell you that, we will take you 
to the trial room, then you will be privileged 
to call your witnesses and so forth." 
Q. All right. 
A. But he was not given the number of 
the room where the trial would be, where 
the trial board would convene, for the pur-
pose of the trial. 
Q. All right. Now what, if anything was 
said to Mr. Hanley or any of the others and 
what if anything was said by Mr. Hanley or 
any of the others? 
A. Well, now you are speaking of J1r. 
Hanley. I can't recall. But Mr. Nichols at 
that point - changing it to Mr. Nichols -
wanted to know the room number. And then 
Mr. Hanley, I'm sure chimed in and also 
wanted to know where the trial would be 
held. He wanted to know where the trial 
would be held. 
That this so called "last chance offer" was ex-
tended only to Nichols and not to either of the plain-
tiffs is further shown by the following quotation 
which appears in the self-serving decision of the 
Trial Board finding both plaintiffs guilty of the 
charges preferred against them ( Exh. 24 and 48) : 
The defendant C. A. Nichols had again 
been excused to attend court on June 7th and 
was not present when the Board ruled that 
the defendants would be tried in absentia, 
consequently the Board advised him to be pre-
sent for trial on Tuesday June 8th. In order 
to forestall the overwhelming of the trial room 
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by the accused and their cohorts, the mem-
bers of the Trial Board met Brother Nichols 
in the lobby of the Statler Hotel at 10:00 
A.lVL on the morning of June 8th. Brother 
Nichols arrived, accompanied by Brothers 
Hanley, Nance and Fuller and about fifteen 
othe1· persons, the later group increasing in 
size until about thirty or forty persons were 
present. The chairman of the Trial Board told 
Brother Nichols that the Board was ready to 
proceed with his trial if he and his counsel 
would come to the trial room unaccompanied 
by the other defendants and the rest of the 
group which was demanding admission. 
It is submitted that defendant cannot show 
any refusal to stand trial on the part of either of 
the plain tiffs on the basis of the so-called "last 
chance offer", which as shown above was made 
only to Nichols. And even if it were extended to 
plaintiffs, there is no showing that they refused 
a proper trial. 
Defendant's attempts to justify plaintiffs' being 
tried in their absence on the ground that the spec-
tators present on the days of the open hearings, i.e., 
on June 3, 4 and 7, failed to obey the repeated de-
mands of the chairman of the Trial Board that the 
trial room be cleared of all "witnesses" and that the 
presence of such spectators and their conduct cre-
ated such confusion and disorder that it was im-
possible for the trials to proceed. The short answer 
to this contention is that plaintiffs were not re-
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sponsible for the presence of the spectators and were 
not responsible for their failure to comply with the 
requests to leave. Hanley repeatedly told the Trial 
Board this ( Exh. 4, pp. 31, 61, 63-64; Exh. 5, pp. 
115, 118). 
Quite apart from the foregoing, the evidence 
is uncontradicted that defendant made all arrange-
ments for holding the trials of the plaintiffs; that 
it rented the room in which the trials were to be 
held; that police officers were present at all times; 
and that there was no disturbance of the peace or 
disorderly conduct on the part of any persons pre-
sent. If the presence or conduct of any persons 
present were such as to prevent an orderly trial, it 
would have been a simple matter for the Trial 
Board to request the police officers present to eject 
the offending parties. The responsibility for con-
ducting orderly trials rested on the defendant and 
on the defendant alone. In these circumstances, the 
following finding of the court below, as set forth 
in its Memorandum of Decision filed December 301 
1959, (R. 349) cannot successfully be challenged: 
7. That neither the petitioner nor the 
intervenor nor any person authorized to speak 
or act for them or either of them conducted 
himself in such a way as to justify the trial 
committee in trying them or either of them in 
absentia. That the evidence presented as to 
the conduct of the petitioner and intervenor 
and other persons at open hearings conducted 
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by the trial committee on June 3, 4 and 7, 
1954, does not show any violence or threat of 
violence or any disturbance of the peace at 
said sessions of the trial committee. That 
police officers were present in the hearing 
room and the court believes that they were 
ready and able to prevent any violence or dis-
turbance of the peace. That protests and ob-
jections made by petitioner and intervenor at 
said open hearings were not so lacking in 
merit as to constitute or be construed as a 
refusal to stand trial or as a waiver of trial, 
or to justify the Trial Board in ordering them 
or either of them to be tried in absentia. 
It follows, therefore, that since neither of the 
plaintiffs refused either by words or by conduct, 
to stand trial, their expulsion was wrongful. For 
no principle of law is better established than that 
no 1nember of a labor organization can be expelled 
except after a trial meeting the minimum require-
nlents of due process, including notice of the time 
and place of trial, the opportunity to be confronted 
by and to cross examine the witnesses called against 
hin1, and to call witnesses and to adduce evidence 
in his defense. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Asso., 
37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P. 2d 6, 21 ALR 2d 1387; 
1llahoney v. Sailors Union of the Pacific, 43 Wash. 
2d 874, 264 P. 2d 1095; Ellis v. American Federa-
tion of Labor, 48 Cal. App. 2d 440, 443-444, 120 
P. 2d 79; Annotation, 21 ALR 2d 1397. 
Indeed, the requirements of proceedural due 
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process are now written into the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Section 
101 (a) (5) of which provides as follows: 
No member of any labor organization may be 
fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise dis-
ciplined, except for non-payment of dues, by 
such organization or any officer thereof un-
less such member has been (A) served with 
written specific charges; (B) given a reason-
able time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded 
a full and fair hearing. 
Since neither of the plaintiffs were accorded the 
benefits of the minimum requirements of due pro-
cess, their expulsion was manifestly wrongful and 
null and void. 
We have no quarrel with the cases cited and 
relied upon by defendant, but they are clearly not 
in point. In Smith v. Kern County Medical Associa-
tion, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P. 2d 87 4, in Davis v. In-
ternational Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 
60 Cal. App. 2d 713, 141 P. 2d 486, in Miller v. I. A. 
of Operrating Engineers, 118 Cal. App. 2d 66, 257 
P. 2d 85, and in Werner v. Int. Assn. of Machinists, 
11 Ill. App. 2d 258, 137 NE 2d 100, the expelled 
member failed to appear at the time set for his trial. 
No such situation confronts us here, for each of the 
plaintiffs appeared and insisted upon the right to 
make his defense. As for the case of Allen v. Los 
Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 51 
Cal. 2d 80'5, 387 P. 2d 457, which defendant cites 
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in support of its contention that plaintiffs should 
be barred from relief because they did not come 
into court with clean hands, it is clearly not in point. 
The clean hands doctrine or rule is a rule which 
pern1i ts a court in its discretion to withhold an 
equitable remedy where the party seeking the remedy 
does not come into court with clean hands. But the 
discretion to grant or withhold the remedy is vested 
in the trier of the fact, that is to say, in the trial 
court. In the Allen case, the trial court exercised 
its discretion in favor of the defendant, whereas in 
the present case the trial court exercised its discre-
tion in favor of the plaintiffs. But in any case, there 
is no basis for saying that either Nance or Hanley 
did not come into court with clean hands. Defendant 
bases its contention to the contrary on plaintiff's 
alleged misconduct before the Trial Board, but as 
we have shown, their conduct was neither improper 
nor censurable in the circumstances. 
POINT IB 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING 
THAT PLAINTIFFS' REMEDIES ON APPEAL DID 
NOT CURE THE DEFECTS OF THE TRIAL BOARD 
PROCEEDINGS. 
The defendant next asserts that regardless of 
any defects in the proceedings before the Trial 
Board, plaintiffs are in no position to complain be-
cause they had the opportunity to incorporate with 
the appeals which they took documentary evidence 
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refuting the charges of which they were found 
guilty. In other words, defendant contends that 
even if plaintiffs were exepelled without having 
charges preferred against them or given any oppor-
tunity whatsoever to defend themselves, they are 
now barred from challenging their expulsion be-
cause of their failure to attach to their appeal 
papers documentary evidence refuting the charges 
on the basis of which they were expelled. The mere 
statement of this contention is sufficient to show 
its fallacy. 
Not only the constitution (Art. 18, Sec. 3(b) 
and Sec. 2 (c) ) , but the general law guaranteed to 
plaintiffs the right to be confronted by and to cross 
examine the witnesses called against them, and to 
call witnesses in their defense. As said in Cason v. 
Glass Bottle Blowers Association, supra: 
The union's procedure, however, must be such 
as will afford the accused member substantial 
justice, and the requirements of a fair trial 
will be imposed even though the rules of the 
union fail to provide therefor. (Citations 
omitted). The authorities recognize that such 
a trial includes the right to notice of charges, 
to confront and cross examine the accusers, 
and to examine and refute the evidence. 
See also Werner v. Int. Ass'n. of Machinists, 
supra, at page 112 of 137 NE 2d. -
This right to cross examine the witnesses called 
against them and to call witnesses in their defense 
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was denied to plaintiffs. The deprivation of that 
right could not be cured by giving plaintiffs the 
chance to present documentary evidence. As a mat-
ter of fact, plaintiffs endeavored to call witnesses 
and to introduce documentary evidence before the 
gTievance and appeals committee, but the committee 
refused to permit them to do so. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT AND ITS OFFICERS 
WERE MALICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND UNREASON-
ABLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREFERRING 
OF CHARGES, TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL 
THROUGH THE UNION PROCEEDING. 
The second point urged by defendant on its 
appeal is that the court below erred in holding that 
in preferring charges against plaintiffs, in the con-
duct of the trial proceedings, as well as in the con-
duct of the appeal proceedings, the defendant and its 
officers acted maliciously toward the plain tiffs. Be-
fol·e proceeding to answer the argument urged by 
defendant in support of this point, we are con-
strained to correct some misconceptions upon which 
the argument is seemingly based. 
In the first place, the question of malice went 
not only to plaintiffs' right to recover exemplary 
dan1ages, as defendant seemingly contends, but also 
to the validity of plaintiff's expulsion. This is shown 
not only by Nance's original petition for a writ of 
57 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mandamus, his reply to defendant's counterclaim, 
and Hanley's complaint in intervention, but also by 
the trial judge's Memorandum of Decision ( Appen-
dix, pp. 1 to 10) and to its Second Supplemental 
lVIemorandum of Decision (Appendix, pp. 19 to 34). 
It is true that in rendering his original decision the 
trial judge postponed his decision as to malice pend-
ing trial before a jury of the issues whether plain-
tiffs had sustained any actual damages as a result 
of their expulsion and whether as a consequence of 
acts committed by defendant subsequent to their 
expulsion they were entitled to exemplary damages 
He did so, however, only ( 1) because he did not 
wish to influence the jury in its consideration of 
the issue whether after plaintiffs' expulsion defen-
dant had acted with malice toward the plaintiffs, 
and (2) he wished to have the benefit of evidence 
as to defendant's conduct after plaintiff's expulsion 
insofar as it might throw light on the issue whether 
in expelling plaintiffs defendant acted wilfully and 
maliciously toward them. The question of malice, 
therefore, went not only to the question whether 
plaintiffs were entitled to exemplary damages, but 
also to the legality of their expulsion. That plain-
tiffs' expulsion was invalid if the whole proceed-
ings taken against them were so far permeated 
with, and the result of malice, as to amount to a 
sham or farce is too clear, we submit, to require argu-
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ment. See for example, Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 7 App. 
Di,·. 2cl 521, 184 NYS 2d 226, where the expulsion 
of "a dissident group whom the entrenched officers 
of the local union, working with or without the aid 
of the Brotherhood representative, were apparently 
seeking to suppress" was set aside. See also, Grand 
Int'l. Bro. of Locomotive Engrs. v. Green, 210 Ala. 
496, 98 So. 596. 
In the second place, the reports which Byron 
received from Fulmor and Ely, and upon which 
defendant maintains Byron acted in preferring 
charges against plaintiffs, did not implicate either 
Hanley or Nance "in a murder, in shake down ac-
tiYities against contractors, etc." as claimed by de-
fendant at page 4 7 of its brief. In this connection, 
defendant's general vice president Cronin described 
the complaints made by Fulmor and Ely as follows 
(NJT 3360): 
Well, Mr. Ely, of course, acted as the spokes-
man for the two and he stated that he came 
to Chicago to meet a representative of the 
International Union, who were meeting with 
the contractors at the time to complain of 
certain situations that existed with regard 
to 108 on the coast. He complained that the 
apprenticeship committee was not function-
ing properly, he complained with regard to 
the working of the Health and Welfare funds 
and he said they were not satisfied with the 
working of the vacation plan and that es-
pecially they were concerned with regard to 
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work stoppages and jurisdictional disputes 
in the Los Angeles area. That was the gist of 
their complaint and that's what they said. 
As for the so called Stetter reports, they were never 
introduced in evidence. What they contained is there-
fore not before the court, except as shown by cross 
examination, the defendant having successfully pre-
vented their introduction in evidence. 
Having thus corrected some obvious inaccur-
acies in defendant's statement, we may proceed to 
answer defendant's argument. Defendant calls at-
tention to the fact that the court found that Byron 
had received reports which if believed would have 
justified him in preferring charges against plain-
tiffs. It concedes, however, that the court also found, 
that in preferring charges against and in expelling 
plaintiffs, defendant and its officers acted wilfully 
and maliciously. Defendant then contends that since 
"at most, the evidence adduced in this issue of good 
faith in the preferring of the charges gave rise to 
two conflicting inferences ... it was error for the 
court to draw the inference of bad faith". In sup-
port of this contention defendant cites the case of 
N.L.R.B. v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, 5 Cir., 
223 F. 2d 7 48. This decision, however, does not cor-
rectly state the law and was expressly repudiated 
by the court which rendered it in N.L.R.B. v. Fox 
Manufacturing Co., 5 Cir., 238 F. 2d 211, in which 
the court at pages 214-215 said: 
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Under the rule announced in Coats & Clark it 
is still our duty to ascertain whether there is 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole 
to make the inferences of legal and illegal dis-
charge reasonably equal. But now if the ?'e-
cord '/,Carrants the conclusion that they are 
reasonably equal, we may not overturn the 
Board's findings of an illegal discharge. 
Nor does Schofield v. Z.C.M.l., 85 Utah 281, 39 
P. 2cl 342, 345, support defendant's contention. In 
that case the court said merely : 
A construction giving an instrument a legal 
effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopt-
ed when it can be reasonably be adopted, and 
between possible constructions, that will be 
adopted which establishes a valid contract. 
Needless to say we are not here dealing with the 
construction of a contract, but with the question 
whether the defendant in expelling plaintiffs acted 
maliciously. The court below found on conflicting 
evidence that defendant so acted and its finding 
cannot be disturbed. If there were two conflicting 
inferences that might be drawn, it was for the trial 
court to select the one that should be drawn. It 
found that defendant acted wilfully and maliciously 
and its finding, we submit, cannot successfully be 
challenged. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING NOM-
INAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
In our argument under this point we will cover 
the questions raised by Points III, IV and V of de-
fendant's brief. 
Defendant's argument that the court below 
erred in awarding nominal and punitive damages 
disregards the stipulation and circumstances under 
which this case was tried. For a recital of this stipu-
lation and circumstances we refer this court to the 
Order as to the Issues to be Submitted to the Jury 
printed at pages 13 to 17 of the appendix to this 
brief, and the facts leading up to the order recited 
in the statement of facts at pages 3 to 5. 
The issue of malice in procuring plaintiff's ex-
pulsion was thus reserved for decision of the judge 
alone. As the trier of that issue of fact he was fully 
authorized to award punitive damages to the plain-
tiffs if he resolved the issues in their favor and if 
the other conditions necessary to sustain such an 
award were present, for an award of punitive dam-
ages may be made by the judge where the factual 
issues are tried by him. Calvat v. Franklin, 90 Colo. 
444, 9 P. 2d 1061; Pure Oil Co. v. Quarles, 183 Okl. 
418, 82 P. 2d 970; Pickwick Stages v. Boa'td of 
Trustees of the City of El Paso De Robles, 54 Cal. 
App. 730, 215 P. 558. 
Here the trial judge resolved the issue of malice 
62 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and bad faith in favor of plaintiffs and also found 
that plaintiffs had suffered actual damages (See 
paragraph 20 of the Second Supplemental Decision 
on page 28 of the appendix to this brief). He was 
therefore authorized to award nominal damages and 
on the basis thereof to award punitive damages, 
for by the great weight of authority an award of 
nmninal damages, where actual damages have been 
suffered, will support an award of punitive dam-
ages. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 
393, 221 P. 2d 965; Reynolds v. Pegler, 2 Cir., 223 
F. 2d 429; Fauver v. Wilkoske, 123 Mont. 228, 211 
P. 2d 420, 17 ALR 2d 518. 
It is true that the jury found that plaintiffs 
had not suffered actual damages, but the judge 
after consideration of all the evidence held that this 
finding was not supported by the evidence, saying: 
Mter due consideration of the evidence pre-
sented before the jury and the answers of the 
jury to Special Interrogatories, the court be-
lieves that the answers of the jury to Special 
Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9 (as to loss 
of earnings and humiliation and mental suf-
fering) are in each case opposed to the weight 
of the evidence and that in each case the an-
swer should have been "yes", also that the 
jury should have awarded actual damages 
to the petitioner and intervenor. The court 
believes from the evidence that both the peti-
tioner and intervenor suffered substantial loss 
of income by reason of having been expelled 
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from the union and also suffered embarrass-
ment and humiliation by reason of such ex-
pulsion and being deprived of privileges and 
benefits of union membership. (Appendix, 
p. 28). 
In these circurastances, the judge was entitled to 
disregard the verdict of the jury and award nom-
inal damages. Indeed, it would have been reversible 
error for the court to have failed to award nominal 
damages, not only for the reason that the evidence 
showed beyond question that plaintiffs had suf-
fered actual damages but also for the reason that 
a right of the plaintiffs had been invaded which re-
quired vindication. Nasner v. Burton, 2 U. 2d 236, 
272 P. 2d 163; Harmony Ditch Co. v. Sweeny, 31 
Wyo. 1, 222 P. 577. 
We turn then to arguments advanced by de-
fendant in support of its contention that the award 
of punitive damages should not be allowed to stand. 
SUB-SECTION A 
Defendant first argues that since this is a suit 
to obtain relief formerly obtainable by a Writ of 
Mandamus as well as equitable relief, the award 
should be set aside because punitive damages are 
not generally allowed in suits in equity. This is a 
most technical argument. Plaintiffs could have 
brought a separate action at law in which they un-
doubtedly could have recovered punitive damages. See 
Grand Int'l. Bro. of Locomotive Engineers vs. Green, 
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supra. They could have brought an independent 
proceeding to have their expulsions set aside. The 
n1ere fact that they sought both types of relief in 
the same action should not deprive them of this 
substantial right. 
In any case, this is not a suit in equity but one 
at law. Writs of Mandamus have been abolished 
in this state (Rule 65B, U. R.C.P.). But the relief 
forn1erly obtainable by a writ of mandamus can now 
be obtained by a civil action (ibid.). In determining, 
however, whether such an action is legal or equit-
able in nature the principles applicable before the 
abolition of the writ are still applicable. A writ of 
n1andamus was never an equitable remedy. His-
torically, it never issued out of the court of chan-
cery but only out of the Court of Kings' Bench. See 
2 Jones' Blackstone's Commentaries, p. 1633. As 
early as 1860 the Supreme Court of the United 
States said that a proceeding to obtain the writ had 
become an ordinary action at law. Kentucky v. Den-
nison, 24 How. 100, 11 L. Ed. 513. So if we are to 
resort to technicalities it is clear that this is not a 
suit in equity but an action at law, and the principle 
on which defendant relies is technically inapplicable. 
Furthermore, in a proceeding such as this dam-
ages resembling exemplary damages, such as dam-
ages for mental suffering, humiliation, etc., are 
clearly recoverable. See Nissen v. International 
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Brotherhood, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 NW 858, 141 
ALR 598. In any case, the rule that exemplary 
damages are not recoverable in equity is not of 
universal application. There are many cases hold-
ing that such damages can be recovered in equity. 
See e.g., Sterling Drug Inc. v. Benatar, supra.; 
Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 20 Cal. App. 
2d 170, 66 P. 2d 1215; Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal. 
App. 2d 225, 194 P. 2d 553. 
S DB-SECTION B 
Defendant next contends that since the present 
proceeding sounds in con tract and not in tort, and 
since exemplary damages are not generally allowed 
in actions for breach of contract, the award of 
punitive damages should be set aside. It is true 
that the basic right which plaintiffs seek to enforce 
is contractual in nature. See !.A.M. v. Gonzales, 356 
U.S. 617, 618, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1018, 78 S. Ct. 923. 
But it is also true that the measure of damages in 
an action such as this is that applicable in actions 
sounding in tort. Cluxfee, The Internal Affairs of 
Associations Not For Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 
1003. As said by Professor Chafee in the article 
last cited, "He (the expelled member) does not 
merely recover for the loss of expected benefits, but 
also recovers for injury to his reputation, just as 
in defamation, and may receive punitive damages." 
He is also entitled to recover "such sums as will 
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compensate him for mental suffering and humilia-
tion caused" by his expulsion. Nissen v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood, supra; Gonzales v. !.A.M., 142 
Cal. App. 2d 202, 298 P. 2d 92, affirmed 356 U.S. 
611, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1018, 78 S. Ct. 923. In this respect, 
the present action is not like an action for breach 
of an ordinary commercial contract, but resembles 
more an action for breach of a contract to marry, 
or an action for a tortious breach of a contract of 
carriage resulting in injury to a passenger, in both 
of which types of actions exemplary damages are 
recoverable. 11 C.J.S. 813, Breach of Marriage Pro-
mise, Sec. 45; Forrester v. Southern Pacific Co., 36 
Nev. 247, 134 P. 753. It is clear, we submit, that 
plaintiffs were entitled to recover exemplary dam-
ages. Grand International Bro. of Locomotives En-
ginee1·s v. Green, supra. 
SUB-SECTION C 
Defendant argues, thirdly, that the court should 
haYe left to the jury the question whether plaintiffs 
were en ti tied to recover exemplary damages be-
cause of the acts of defendants and its officers in 
procuring plaintiffs' expulsion. As shown by its 
Order as to the Issues to be Submitted to the Jury 
(Appendix, pp. 13-17) the court did submit to 
the jury the question whether plaintiffs were en-
titled to exemplary damages because of acts com-
mitted after plaintiffs' expulsion but reserved to 
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itself the question whether in procuring plaintiffs' 
expulsion defendant and its officers acted mali-
ciously, and whether on account thereof plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover punitive damages. This was 
done pursuant to a stipulation of the parties that 
the issue whether plaintiffs were wrongfully expelled 
should be determined by the court. That included 
the issue, as we have shown, whether in effecting 
plaintiffs' expulsion defendant acted in good faith 
or with malice. Since the court was to determine 
this factual issue, it was for the court and not the 
jury to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled 
to punitive damages on account of defendant bring-
ing about plaintiffs' expulsion. Calvat v. Franklin, 
supra, Pure Oil Co. v. Quarles, supra; Pickwick 
Stages vs. Board of Trustees, etc., supra. If it were 
otherwise, all of the evidence introduced before the 
court in 10 weeks of trial would have had to be re-
introduced before the jury - an unthinkable pro-
cedure. 
SUB-SECTION D 
The fourth argument advanced by defendant 
for disallowing punitive damages is that since de-
fendant is not a legal entity, all of its funds are 
the joint property or assets of all of its members; 
that to a ward punitive damages is to assess them 
indirectly against the whole membership; and that 
accordingly the malice or bad faith of defendant's 
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officers should not be imputed to the defendant. 
In support of this argument defendant cites La1vlor 
1'. Loewe, 2 Cir., 187 F. 522 (the famous Danbury 
Hatter's Case) ; s~veetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 
:i-±9, 161 NE 272, 62 ALR 311; Schneider v. Local 
60, 116 La. 270, 5 LRA (NS) 891; and Martin v. 
Curran, 303 NY 276, 101 NE 2d 683. None of these 
cases are in point. None of these cases involved the 
question whether a labor union could be held liable 
for exemplary damages. The first three involved 
attempts to impose personal liability on individual 
1nen1bers. Obviously they are not in point because 
no such attempt is being made here. Any judgment 
rendered in this action will be recoverable only from 
the common funds of the union, and no part of it 
can be enforced against the property or assets of 
the individual members. Rule 17 (d), U.R.C.P. In 
J.lllartin v. Curran, supra, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that a labor union could not be held 
liable for damages for libel unless the pleadings and 
proof showed that all of the members had author-
ized or ratified the publication of the libel. But in 
the later case of Madden v. Atkins, 4 NY 2d 283, 
151 NE 2d 73, which defendant does not cite, the 
same court held that the principle or rule is inap-
plicable in the case of actions for wrongful expul-
sion from membership. In that case the court said: 
The Appellate Division was of the view, how-
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ever, that the precedents forbade an action 
against a union for damages unless proof es-
tablished an authorization or ratification of 
the expulsion by all of the members and there-
by rendered each and every one of them re-
sponsible for the wrong committed. While we 
have held that to be the law where damages 
are sought against an unincorporated asso-
ciation on account of libel (see Martin v. 
Curran, 303 NY 276, 101 NE 2d 683) the 
rule is otherwise in case of wrongful expul-
sion. 
The cases relied upon by defendant do not, 
therefore, support its argument. That its argument 
cannot be sustained is further established by the 
fact that labor unions can be and have been held 
liable for punitive damages in cases such as this. 
Moreover, the acts of defendant's officers in expel-
ling plaintiffs were ratified by defendant's griev-
ance and appeals committee and general convention. 
This was enough to render defendant liable for their 
acts. 
SUB-SECTION E 
Defendant next argues that it was error for 
the court to award punitive damages after the jury 
had found that plaintiffs had suffered no actual 
damages. We have already answered this argument, 
but we deem it prudent again to call the courts at-
tention to the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Montana in Fauver v. W ilkoske, supra. There the 
jury found that the plaintiffs had suffered no ac-
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tual damage but awarded exemplary damages. The 
Supreme Court upheld the award since it appeared 
that the plaintiff must in fact have suffered actual 
damages. In so doing it reversed several of its prior 
decisions in favor of what it deemed to be the better 
rule. See also, Sterling Drug Inc., v. Benatar, supra, 
and Calvat v. Franklin, supra. 
SUB-SECTION F 
Defendant further agrues that "the award of 
punitive damages in this case is erroneous as a 
matter of law because in Utah ... punitive dam-
ages are not allowed unless compensatory damages 
based on the tortius or illegal conduct are recovered" 
(italics added). In support of this argument de-
fendant cites and relies upon Graham v. Street, 2 
Utah 2d 144, 270 P. 2d 456. But it is plain, how-
ever, that this case does not support the argument. 
There the trial court had made an award of com-
pensatory damages in the sum of $5,000 on the 
basis of "highly speculative matters - distress, 
anxiety and the effect on profits if Graham's ex-
perience and contacts had been utilized - which 
according to defendant's contention, not denied by 
plaintiffs, were unsupported by proof upon which 
the court could base an intelligent decree". In other 
words, the plaintiff failed to show that he had suf-
fered any actual damages, and having failed to show 
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actual damages, the a ward of punitive damages 
necessarily fell. 
As we have shown above, if a plaintiff proves 
that he has in fact suffered actual damages, an 
a ward of punitive damages may be made even 
though no compensatory damages are recovered. 
This is confirmed by the recent decision of this 
court in Os_~ertag v. LaMont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 
P. 2d 1022, wherein Chief Justice Crockett said: 
It is undisputed that it was necessary for 
the (plaintiff) to expend $140 for doctor and 
dental bills incident to his injuries. The jury 
awarded him only this sum but nothing for 
the pain and suffering, loss of earnings, or 
for humiliation and injury to his feelings, all 
of which may properly be considered in award-
ing damages for such an assault. It is ob-
vious that an award of some further compen-
satory damages would have been justified. 
The fact that the verdict gave him nothing 
but his actual expenditures, does not mean 
that that is all the damage he suffered, nor 
is it any reason for depriving him of the $860 
award of punitive damages. That award could 
be set aside if it 1vere clearly excessive in 
view of the evidence as a whole and in com-
parison to the damages actually sustained. 
We do not think the award as adjusted by the 
trial court can be properly so characterized. 
SUB-SECTION G 
Under this heading defendant advances two 
arguments. First, it reiterates its argument that 
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the award of punitive damages must be set aside 
because the amount thereof is disproportionate to 
actual or nominal damages recovered. As we have 
sho\\·n, this argument is untenable. The amount of 
punitive damages awarded must bear some reason-
able relationship to the amount of actual damages 
suffel'ed or sustained, but it need not bear any re-
lationship to the actual damages awarded. The rule 
requiring a reasonable relationship between puni-
tive damages and actual damages sustained, the 
reason for applying it, and the weight to be given 
to it were explained by this court in Ostertag v. 
Lamont, supra, as follows: 
As with damages for injuries generally there 
is no method for exact calculation as to puni-
tive damages, nor is there any precise for-
mula for the relationship of punitive damages 
to actual damages. The jury from its advan-
taged position must necessarily be allowed a 
broad discretion in such matters. It is true 
that this court has stated a number of times 
that punitive damages must bear some reas-
onable relationship to actual damages. This 
is so because they must not be so dispropor-
tionate as to manifest that they were awarded 
as a result of passion or prejudice, or under 
misconception of, or in disregard of the law 
or the evidence. But the relationship of puni-
tive damages to actual damages awarded is 
only one of the facts to be considered in deter-
mining whether the amount awarded should 
be sustained. In appraising the punitive dam-
ages to see whether they are so excessive as 
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to require a nullification of the verdict or 
correction as a matter of law, it is necessary 
to survey all of the circumstances as disclosed 
by the evidence. 
Here it is impossible to say that in assessing 
punitive damages the trial judge was guilty of pas-
sion or prejudice or was laboring under a miscon-
ception or in disregard of the law or the evidence. 
The damages suffered by plaintiffs were great and 
extensive. Their loss of earnings alone exceeded 
the amount of punitive damages awarded. In addi-
tion, they suffered humiliation by being branded as 
expelled members. They were deprived of all of the 
benefits and privileges of union membership. It is 
idle for defendant to argue that these were with-
out value. It is indeed something of a paradox for 
a labor organization of the magnitude of the defen-
dant to urge such an argument while continuing 
to accept dues and assesments from its members 
and urging workmen to join it. Not only were the 
damages naturally flowing from plaintiffs' expul-
sion great, but not content with expelling plain-
tiffs, defendant as shown by the uncontradicted 
evidence took affirmative action to see that these 
damages were increased by instructing the business 
agents of it local unions to make certain that plain-
tiffs did not work. In view of all of the facts and 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, it is plain 
that the punitive damages are not so excessive as to 
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n·quire a nullification or correction of the award 
thereof. Compare Reynolds v. Pegler, supra, where 
an award of $1.00 actual damages and $100,000 
punitive damages was upheld. 
Secondly, the defendant argues that the trial 
court considered improper factors. There is plainly 
no 1nerit in this contention. Certainly there is noth-
ing improper in considering the fact "trial in ab-
sentia, where there has been no consent or waiver, 
is abhorrent to the principles of justice and fair 
play". Even the Codes of Ethical Practices of the 
AFL-CIO recognize this to be a fact, in providing 
that in union disciplinary proceedings, "the essen-
tial requirements of due process - notice, hearing 
and judgment on the evidence - should be ob-
served". Nor was there anything improper in the 
court's taking into consideration the fact that" the 
wealth and power of an international labor union 
was arrayed against individual union members with 
n1eager resources". See Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 
362, 267 P. 2d 759. Likewise, it was not improper 
for the court to consider the fact that the grievance 
and appeals committee of defendant's general con-
Yention had full knowledge of the injustice inflicted 
upon plaintiffs and failed to take any action to cor-
rect it; or the fact that for four long years plain-
tiffs had been known and referred to as expelled 
members and deprived of the benefits and privileges 
75 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of union membership; or the fact that defendant 
deliberately prolonged the trial of this action by 
two intermediate appeals, constant and repeated 
frivolous objections and other dilatory tactics to 
the detriment of plaintiffs and to the great expense 
of the taxpayers. In this connection there is noth-
ing in the record to substantiate defendant's charge 
that the punitive damages were awarded "in part 
on account of the fact that the union had the tem-
erity to defend this case in the first place and be-
cause the trial below cost the county and its tax~ 
payers some money". And the court below most 
certainly did not penalize appellant union for de-
fending itself instead of confessing judgment. It 
did, however, and quite properly we think, take into 
account the manner in which it conducted its de-
fense. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AND 
'DHE POWER TO ENFORCE THE WRIT OF MAN-
DATE, AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH 
SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
Defendant next urges two contentions. First, 
that the court was without jurisdiction to issue a 
writ of mandamus because if one were issued it 
would be powerless to enforce it, since none of de-
fendant's officers reside in Utah so as to be amen-
able to process of the courts of this state; and sec-
ondly, that the court erred in overruling defendant's 
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motion to quash the service of process upon it. Both 
of these contentions were urged on defendant's 
first application for an intermediate appeal, and 
the application was denied. (Case No. '8673). 
Neither contention can be sustained. The first, 
that the writ should be denied because the court 
would be without power to enforce it since defen-
dant's officers are non-residents of this state, is 
plainly untenable. If it were sound there would not be 
a court in the United States that would have jurisdic-
tion to compel defendant to reinstate plaintiffs. De-
fendant's principal officers to not reside in the same 
jurisdiction. Their residences are scattered through-
out n1any states. There is not a court in the nation 
that could acquire jurisdiction of a sufficient num-
ber of them to compel them, by physical restraint, 
to obey a command to reinstate plaintiffs. In any 
case, defendant's argument is based on a false and 
untenable premise. The court below has both juris-
diction and power to compel defendant to obey its 
conunand. Section 78-35-10, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
When a peremptory writ of mandate or writ 
of prohibition has been issued and directed to 
an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or 
person, if it appears to the court that any 
member of such tribunal, corporation, board, 
or person upon whom such writ has been per-
sonally served, has without just excuse, re-
fused or neglected to obey the same, the court 
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may upon motion, impose a fine not exceeding 
$500. In cases of persistence in refusal, the 
court may order the party imprisoned until 
the writ is obeyed, and may make any orders 
necessary and proper for the complete en-
forcement of the writ. 
Section 78-32-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
The following acts or omissions in respect to 
a court or proceeding therein are contempts 
of the authority of the court ... 
5. Disobedience of any lawful judg-
ment, order, or process of the court. 
It is thus apparent that disobedience of the 
command to reinstant the plaintiffs could be en-
forced by process of contempt. It is today well set-
tled that a labor union or other unincorporated 
association, as such and as distinguished from its 
officers and agents, may be adjudged guilty of con-
tempt. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 
U.S. 258, 91 L. Ed. 884, 67 S. Ct. 677; Oil Workers 
Int'l Union v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 
230 P. 2d 71, 104-106. Upon being adjudged guilty 
of contempt, such an association can be compelled 
to obey the court's command by the levy of a coer-
cive fine. For example, in the United Mine Workers 
case, supra, the court had issued an injunction re-
straining the defendant from continuing a strike. 
The strike was already in progress when the in-
junction was issued, so that the injunction was in 
effect a mandatory injunction. The union failed 
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to call off the strike and the defendant and its 
president, John L. Lewis, were cited for contempt. 
The court adjudged both in contempt, and imposed 
fixed fines on both the union and its president, and 
in addition thereto a coercive fine upon the union 
of $100,000 a day for each day the strike continued 
in violation of the injunction. The Supreme Court 
of the United States, although reducing the fixed 
fine assessed against the union, affirmed the trial 
court's order insofar as it imposed the coercive 
fine. Needless to say, the strike was called off and 
the injunction promptly obeyed. 
The court's command to reinstate the plaintiffs 
in this case can be enforced by similar process, 
particularly in view of the fact that the defendant 
has assets consisting of dues and per capita taxes 
which are constantly accruing to it from its local 
union and members in Utah, that can be reached 
by the process of the courts of this state. The argu-
lnent that the court would be powerless to enforce 
a writ of mandate compelling defendant to rein-
state the plaintiffs to membership is therefore with-
out n1erit. 
The defendant relies upon Pratt v. Amalga-
mated Ass'n. of Street & Electric Rwy. Employees, 
50 Utah 472, 167 P. 830. In that case, the plaintiff 
sought a writ of mandate to compel the defendant 
to permit plaintiff to transfer from one local union 
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to another. This court approved a judgment denying 
him relief on the ground that he was not entitled 
thereto on the merits. As an alternative ground of 
decision, this court held that the writ should be 
denied because the court would be powerless to en-
force it, since only one of the defendant's officers 
resided within this state, and he alone could not 
effect compliance with the writ. This latter holding 
is but an application of the principle that a writ 
of mandamus will not issue where the issuance 
thereof would be futile. 55 C.J.S. 36, Mandamus 
Sec. 11. But that principle is never applied unless 
it is "clear that no benefit can result from the issu-
ance of the writ" (ibid.). See also, Skeen v. Pratt, 
87 Utah 121, 48 P. 2d 457; Horn v. Superior Court, 
94 Cal. App. 2d 283, 210 P. 2d 518. In any case, 
the Pratt case was decided in 1917, more than 43 
years ago. At that time the concepts that an un-
incorporated association as such can be adjudged 
guilty of contempt and that obedience to a court's 
order can be compelled by means of coercive fines 
had not been developed. Insofar as the case holds 
that a writ of mandamus should be denied because 
of the absence of officers capable of affecting com-
pliance therewith, it does not represent the law 
today. In this connection, it is significant that al-
though it has been cited many times in numerous 
jurisdictions in support of other propositions, it has 
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never been cited in support of the proposition that 
a writ of mandamus should be denied because of 
the absence of natural persons competent to effect 
cmnpliance therewith. 
But quite apart from the foregoing, the plain-
tiffs sought, as permitted by the Utah Rules of 
Ci,·il Procedure, not only a writ of mandamus, but 
abo a judgment declaring plaintiffs' expulsion to 
be null and void, as well as damages. The judgment 
entered gran ted the relief prayed. Even if the writ 
of 1nandate were improvidently granted for want 
of power to enforce it, the balance of the judgment 
is unassailable on the ground and it is en ti tied to 
full faith and credit throughout the United States. 
The second contention urged by defendant, nam-
ely that the court erred in refusing to quash the 
selTice of process on the ground that defendant is 
not subject to service of process in the State of Utah, 
is equally without merit. Defendant is an unin-
corporated association and is a resident of every 
state in which it has members and carries on the 
business and functions for which it was organized. 
Defendant not only has members in the State of 
Utah, but is also carrying on its business and func-
tions in this State. Service of process was made 
on David Turner, then an International Organizer 
appointed and paid by defendant. At that time Tur-
ner was actively carrying on defendant's business 
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in the State of Utah. See the affidavit of Edward 
Carlough, defendant's General Secretary-Treasurer. 
( R. 11-12) . In these circumstances the process was 
plainly properly served under Rule 4( e) ( 4), and 
Rule 17(d), URCP. 
Defendant cites and relies upon W ein v. Croc-
kett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P. 2d 222. It is difficult 
to see what conceivable bearing that case can have 
on the case at bar. It dealt with the amenability to 
suit in this state of a non-resident individual under 
Rule 17(e), URCP. It has nothing to do with the 
amenability to suit of or with the service of pro-
cess upon an unincorporated association having 
members in this state and carrying on its business 
and functions in this state. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAIN-
TIFFS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEY FEES. 
Plaintiffs were clearly entitled to recover at-
torneys fees in this type of action, whether it be re-
garded as a proceeding in mandamus or a suit in 
equity. If it be regarded as a proceeding in man-
damus the allowance of attorneys fees is expressly 
authorized by Section 78-35-9, UCA 1953. Colorado 
Development Co. v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P. 2d 914. 
If the proceeding be regarded as one in equity, at-
torneys fees would nevertheless be recoverable. For 
example, in Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 376, 
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191 N. E. 661, an expelled member brought a suit 
in equity against a trade union to have his expul-
sion set aside. Holding that he was entitled to re-
cover atorneys fees, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts said: 
In actions based on wrongful conduct, where 
the wrong is of such character that the proper 
protection of plaintiff's rights necessarily re-
quires him to employ counsel to gain redress 
of the wrong, he may recover as an element of 
damage reasonable counsel fees. 
The rule so laid down is in accord with the prin-
ciples enunciated by this court in Spoul v. Parks, 
116 Utah 365, 210 P. 2d 436. 
Defendant argues, however, that attorneys fees 
are recoverable only as an element of "damages", 
and since the obligation of plaintiffs to pay attor-
neys fees was contingent upon their succeeding in 
the litigation, they will not be damaged by the dis-
allowance of attorneys fees. Defendant states in its 
brief that the fee arrangement between plaintiffs 
and their attorneys was incomprehensible. Although 
verbal, the arrangement was not vague and un-
certain as claimed by defendant. It is clear that 
the fee was contingent, to be a reasonable amount 
if judgment for reinstatement only was obtained 
and a percentage of the amount recovered if a judg-
ment for damages was obtained (Post-T. 4-27-59, 
pp. 92, 103, 106, 115, 120-122, 130). It is probably 
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incomprehensible to defendant that "a man's word 
is as good as his bond". There is no merit to de-
fendant's argument that plaintiffs will not be dam-
aged by the payment of attorneys fees. Should plain-
tiffs fail in this action, they would not be entitled 
to recover anything. Should they succeed, the amount 
of their recovery will clearly be diminished by the 
amount they must pay their attorneys. To that ex-
tent they will be damaged. Should they succeed only 
in effecting their reinstatement, they would both 
by express agreement and as a matter of la\v be 
obligated to pay a reasonable attorneys fee. To that 
extent they would be damaged. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN TAXING CER-
TAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
The defendant finally complains that the court 
erred in taxing the fees and mileage of the witnesses 
called by the plaintiffs who testified before the jury. 
It maintains that since the jury returned a verdict 
for the defendant as to damages after expulsion, it 
was the prevailing party as to that phase of the 
case within the meaning of Rule 54(d) (1) URCP, 
and not the losing party within the meaning of 
Section 21-51-8, UCA 1953. Accordingly, it claims 
that it is not liable for the witness fees and mileage 
in question. The short and complete answer to this 
contention is that this is not two cases but a single 
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action. On the case as a whole, plaintiffs won and 
defendant lost and thus plaintiffs were the prevail-
ing parties and are clearly en ti tied to recover the 
challenged costs. Checketts v. Collins, 78 Utah 93, 
1 P. 2d 950. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
As said before, the jury returned a verdict in 
faYOl' of defendant on the issues whether plaintiffs 
had suffered actual damages as a result of their 
expulsion, and whether because of acts of defen-
dant and its officers committed after the expulsion 
plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages. A time-
ly n1otion for new trial was filed on the ground, 
muong others, of insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict. The court overruled the motion, 
but in its order overruling the motion the court 
found as follows (R. 619-620): 
17. With reference to the contention of the 
petitioner and intervenor that the verdict of 
the jury is contrary to the evidence, the court 
believes that the answers of the jury to Spe-
cial Interrogatories Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9 are in 
each case contrary to the preponderance of 
the evidence and that the answer to each of 
said interrogatories should have been "yes". 
The court also believes that the jury should 
have awarded actual damages to both the peti-
tioner and intervenor. The court believes that 
the preponderance of the evidence shows : 
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(a) That both the petitioner and intervenor 
suffered substantial loss of income between 
July 1, 1954, and the time of trial as a proxi-
mate result of their expulsion from the re-
spondent association. 
(b) That during the period mentioned em-
ployers of sheet metal workers in Nevada, 
Arizona, California and Utah generally re-
quested union clearance in employing workers. 
(c) That officers of respondent's locals cus-
tomarily gave preference to union members 
in referring or giving clearance to men for 
work and generally refused to give clearance 
to expelled members of the union. 
(d) That many employers of sheet metal 
workers were reluctant to employ expelled 
members of a union for fear of labor troubles. 
(e) That, regardless of so-called right-to-
work laws, officers of respondent's local 
unions generally gave preference to union 
members in work referrals or clearances. 
(f) That the respondent association has lo-
cals throughout the United States and Canada 
and non-members of the union and men known 
to have been expelled from the union are 
seriously handicapped in obtaining or retain-
ing employment in the sheet metal industry. 
(g) That both the petitioner and intervenor 
suffered very substantial loss of income by 
reason of their expulsion and being known as 
expelled members of the union during the 
period of more than four and a half years 
elapsing between the expulsion and the time 
of trial. 
(h) That both the petitioner and intervenor 
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suffered embaiTassment and humiliation by 
reason of their expulsion and being deprived 
of privileges, associations and benefits of 
union membership. 
(i) That although a number of employers 
of sheet metal workers in the Las Vegas area 
had had serious labor troubles during the 
time when the intervenor, Hanley, was In 
te1·national Representative for the respondent 
association and were consequently hostile to 
him and would not give have given him em-
ployment regardless of union membership, 
other employers of sheet metal workers there 
and elsewhere would have given Hanley or 
Nance employment if they could have ob-
tained clearance from local union officers. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, which 
constitute a concise and accurate summary of the 
evidence presented before the jury, the court over-
ruled the motion because it concluded that the jury's 
verdict was binding upon it. In so doing, the court 
was plainly in error. 
The test to be applied by a trial judge in pas-
sing upon a motion for a new trial is different from 
that to be applied in passing upon a motion for a 
directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. In the case of the latter two 
motions, if there is any evidence to support the 
verdict the motions must be denied; but in the case 
of a n1otion for a new trial, if the judge is convinced 
that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence, the motion should be granted notwithstand-
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ing the fact that the evidence may be conflicting. 
King v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 212 
P. 2d 692; Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P. 
2d 722 (concurring opinion of Crockett, J.). Accord-
ingly such cases at Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 
5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P. 2d 622; Sickle v. Union Paci-
fic R. R. Co., 122 Utah 477, 251 P. 2d 867; Heywood 
v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 6 Utah 2d 155, 302 
P. 2d 1045 are not applicable here. 
In the present case, the trial judge having af-
firmatively found that the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence, it was error for him not 
to have granted a new trial. Thus, in Gulf Power 
Co. v. Bagby, 113 Fla. 739, 152 So. 23, the trial 
judge in passing upon a motion for a new trial 
found that the verdict was against the weight of 
the evidence, but nevertheless denied the motion 
because another jury in a previous trial had returned 
the same verdict. The Supreme Court of Florida 
held that this was reversible error, saying: 
Where, however, the trial judge in his order 
denying the motion for a new trial declares 
on the record that in his judicial opinion that 
the verdict is contrary to the probative force 
and weight of the evidence, it is his duty to 
give effect to that judicial determination and 
award a new trial. If he declines to do so and 
denies the motion, such action constitutes 
error, and unless the appellate court is con-
vinced that a new trial should not be grant-
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ed because of insufficiency of the evidence on 
behalf of the prevailing party, the judgment 
should be reversed. 
See to the same effect: People v. Robarge, 41 
Cal. 2d 628, 262 P. 2d 14; People v. Hines, 128 Cal. 
App. 2d 421, 275 P. 2d 585. 
Clearly, we submit, the court here erred in not 
granting a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
should in all respects be affirmed, except insofar 
as it denies plaintiffs' recovery of actual damages 
and punitive damages for acts of defendants and its 
officers committed after the expulsion, and that 
as to those rna tters, and as to those matters only, 
the case be remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES P. McCUNE 
53 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 
A. M. DREYER 
109 South Third Street 
Las Vegas, Nevada 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents and Cross-Appellants 
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